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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: TRANSPARENT
ADJUDICATION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
TRACEY L. MEARES* & BERNARD E. HARCOURT"
The October 1999 Term was a year of consolidation in the
law of police investigations in constitutional criminal procedure.
In four short and compact opinions-three supported by size-
able majorities and three written by the Chief Justice-the Su-
preme Court synthesized and consolidated its criminal
procedure jurisprudence, and offered clear guidance to law en-
forcement officers and private citizens alike. Miranda warnings
are required by the Fifth Amendment, and the police must con-
tinue to "Mirandize" citizens before conducting any custodial
interrogations.' Reasonable suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment calls for a totality-of-the-circumstances test, and a
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citizen's flight from the police in a high crime neighborhood
amounts to reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry stop
and frisk.2 In contrast, a tip from an anonymous informant
merely describing a suspect does not give rise to reasonable sus-
picion.3 The reasonable expectation of privacy test continues to
govern whether the Fourth Amendment protections are trig-
gered, and travelers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
opaque soft-sided luggage.4
We have differences of opinion as to the outcome in some
of these cases. And we have sharply disagreed in the past about
the soundness of other criminal procedure decisions. Last
Term, for instance, we parted company on the desirability and
constitutionality of Chicago's anti-gang loitering ordinance. In
the Morales litigation, one of us, Tracey Meares, co-authored an
amicus brief in support of the ordinance and directed the Su-
preme Court's attention to empirical evidence of its effective-
ness in combating gang-related violence in Chicago.5 Bernard
Harcourt took issue with Meares on both the wisdom and the
validity of the Chicago ordinance and challenged the empirical
foundation for one of the principal theories behind the ordi-
nance, namely the broken windows theory.6 Still today, we dis-
agree strongly about what the empirical evidence proves, how to
approach the empirical issues, and how properly to balance the
interests at stake.7
2 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
' SeeJ.L. v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000).
4SeeBond v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1462 (2000).
' See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations in Support of Peti-
tioner, Chicago v. Morales, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121), available in LEXIS,
Supreme Court Cases and Materials Library, U.S. Supreme Court Briefs File; see also
Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEORGETOWN LAWJOuRNAL 1153 (1998).
6 See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New
York Style, 97 Michigan Law Review 291 (1998); see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Ma-
trioshka Dolls, in URGENT TIms: POLICING AND RIGHT IN INNER Crry COMMuNmES
(1999).
Compare Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms oj) Order in the Inner
City, 32 LAw & Soc'Y REv Ew 805 (1998) with Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social
Meaning Turn": Implications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary
Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REvIw 179 (2000).
FOREWORD: TRANSPARENTADJUDICATION
In this Foreword, however, we put aside our differences and
link arms to call for a new generation of criminal procedure ju-
risprudence, one that places empirical and social scientific evi-
dence at the very heart of constitutional adjudication. We are
calling for a mode of judicial decision-making and academic
debate that treats social scientific and empirical assessment as a
crucial element in constitutional decision-making, thereby mak-
ing criminal procedure decisions more transparent. By more
transparent, we mean to describe adjudication that expressly
and openly discusses the normative judgments at the core of
constitutional criminal procedure. Judicial decisions that ad-
dress the relevant social science and empirical data are more
transparent in that they expressly articulate the grounds for fac-
tual assertions and, as a result, more clearly reflect the interpre-
tive choices involved in criminal procedure decision-making.
We are not so naive or idealistic as to think that increased atten-
tion to empirical evidence will guarantee right answers in crimi-
nal procedure cases. But use of empirical evidence will produce
a clearer picture of the existing constitutional landscape and
spotlight the normative judgments at the heart of criminal pro-
cedure cases.
In this sense, we are calling for a third path in the larger
constitutional debate between Richard Posner's empiricism and
Ronald Dworkin's interpretivism. We agree with Posner that
"the lack of an empirical footing... always has been the Achil-
les heel of constitutional law, not the lack of a good constitu-
tional theory,"" but we are not writing against constitutional
theory. To the contrary, we endorse the Court's balancing-of-
interests jurisprudence in the criminal procedure context and
suggest that it in fact invites consideration of empirical evidence
in the normative task of weighing competing constitutional in-
terests. We emphasize, however, that the need for increased at-
tention to social science data is equally important under more
formalist or rights-oriented jurisprudential approaches. We
agree with Dworkin that interpretive judgments are central to
constitutional decision-making, but we disagree with his claim
8 Richard Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
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that these judgments can be made in an empirical vacuum.9
Theoretical principles cannot properly resolve difficult criminal
procedure cases without the assistance of empirical evidence.
The most current and reliable empirical and social scientific
evidence must inform the normative judgments at the heart of
constitutional criminal procedure.
Indeed, greater attention to empirical and social science
evidence is necessary precisely in order to shed better light on
the normative judgments that we make in criminal procedure.
We are writing this Foreword together to emphasize that the
turn toward empirical and social scientific research is neither
ideologically motivated, nor outcome determinative. In the
words of another commentator, "Facts cannot replace constitu-
tional theory, nor can they mechanistically resolve questions
posed by theory. Instead, empirical knowledge is most useful in
unmasking the theoretical assumptions that undergird constitu-
tional law, in focusing those theories, and in contributing to a
multidimensional view of society that informs the substance of
constitutional law."'1
I. THE LANDSCAPE OF MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Modern constitutional criminal procedure emerged in a le-
gal culture shaped by American legal realism and historically
has been driven by empirical and pragmatic concerns about po-
lice practices, police-civilian encounters, crime prevention and
detection, and civil liberties. One of the most notable features
of the constitutionalization of criminal procedure in the 1960s
was the Supreme Court's focus on the realities of street policing,
custodial interrogations, investigations, and the impact of these
activities on individual freedoms. Judicial decisions and aca-
demic writing in modern criminal procedure, to a far greater
extent than in most legal fields-especially other areas of consti-
tutional law-routinely centered on empirical issues surround-
ing the effectiveness of police practices and their impact on
9 See Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-the Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6J.L. & Euc. 3 (1977).
'0 Deborah Jones Merrit, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to ChiefJudge Pos-




The Court's recognition and embrace of real world experi-
ence forced a rejection of the formalism characteristic of nine-
teenth century Fourth and Fifth Amendment decisions.'
Modem criminal procedure jurisprudence gravitated naturally
toward a balancing-of-interests approach. As a result, it is com-
monplace today to describe constitutional rights relating to
criminal procedure as guaranteeing a reasonable balance be-
tween liberty and order. 2 While recognition of this kind of bal-
ancing is thought to be the hallmark of interpreting the
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, 3 it is also relevant to
analysis of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments as well. 4 It reflects,
in effect, a larger form of constitutional reasoning that has be-
come, as Alexander Aleinikoff remarked in a 1987 article,
"widespread, if not dominant, over the last four decades."' 5
We refer to this balancing of liberty and order interests as a
"balancing-of-interests" jurisprudential approach. It is different
than the conventional balancing test used in cases like Mathews
v. Eldridge, which weighs costs and benefits in a particular case.
It calls, instead, for balancing liberty and order interests at a
higher level-at the level of formulating criminal procedure
rules, like the requirement of "reasonable suspicion" rather
than "probable cause" in the stop-and-frisk encounter, or the
extension of the concept of "legal compulsion" to the police sta-
tion house under the Fifth Amendment.
The Court's tendency to engage in this kind of balancing in
the constitutional criminal procedure context is pervasive. So
" For examples of that formalism, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
(elucidating the relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (discussing Fourth Amendment); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (discussing Fourth Amendment).
12 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendrick, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
"See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
"With regard to the Fifth Amendment, see infra notes 77-153 and accompanying
text; with regard to the Sixth Amendment, see, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin 407 U.S. 25
(1972).
" T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 943 (1987); see also Symposium, When Is a Line as Long as a Rock Is Heavy?: Recon-
ciling Public Values and Individual Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 45 HASINGS LJ.
707 (1994).
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pervasive, in fact, that it is often taken for granted. Consider
the case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte1 6 This case is best known
for establishing a fact-intensive totality-of-the-circumstances re-
view where a suspect has consented to a police search. In
Schneckloth, the Court refused to require that the consenting in-
dividual have knowledge of her right to refuse the search as a
prerequisite to establishing voluntariness. Instead, the Court
adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances test to assess whether the
person searched consented to the police action.8 While the to-
tality-of-the-circumstances test is not itself a balancing analysis,' 9
notice how the Court defined the voluntariness test in Schneck-
loth:
As with police questioning, two competing concerns must be accommo-
dated in determining the meaning of a "voluntary" consent-the legiti-
mate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of
assuring the absence of coercion.
In other words, the Court treated "voluntariness" itself as a
balancing of the needs of efficient law enforcement and protec-
tion against coercion-of order and liberty. The assessment of
"voluntariness" is by no means simply an assessment of the con-
senting party's state of mind at the time of the search and con-
sent.2' Nor is "voluntariness" merely a question of the propriety
of police conduct, such as the failure to apprise an individual of
her right to refuse the search.2 2 Instead, the Court made "vol-
untariness" a placeholder for an analysis of the competing in-
terests of order and liberty-for a balancing-of-interests
approach. In effect, it is the resulting balancing that deter-
mines the scope of the right.23
16 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
1 See id., 412 U.S. at 224.
See id. at 226.
'" See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 15 at 945 (distinguishing balancing from "totality
of the circumstances" approaches).
2' 412 U.S. at 227.
21 See id. at 224.
2See id. at 226.
3 See id at 224-25 ("Voluntariness has reflected an accommodation of the complex
of values implicated in police questioning of a suspect."). Attention to the balancing
that underlies Schneckloth's totality-of-the-circumstances test could bring greater clarity
FOREWORD: TRANSPARENTADJUDICATION
The gradual and relatively recent emergence of modem
criminal procedure-and with it, of the balancing-of-interests
approach in constitutional criminal procedure-has been a
mixed blessing. On the one hand, the adoption of balancing
tests may promote a potentially more transparent mode ofjudi-
cial decision-making in criminal procedure. Explicit balancing
may encourage the judiciary to be more honest about the inevi-
table value judgments that courts do and must make.24 It is an
approach that may render the judiciary more accountable to the
American public and more open to criticism.
On the other hand, the lack of a full-blown realist critique
of the criminal procedure field may have undermined the qual-
ity of the balancing tests used in constitutional criminal proce-
dure. In many judicial opinions and, often, in academic
commentary, balancing is merely a veil that masks bald asser-
tions of political ideology. Rather than guiding the decision-
making process, criminology, police studies, and the social sci-
ences are often deplored as mere rhetorical flourishes, as
tropes, or as mythology.
The result is that, today, constitutional criminal procedure
decisions are often marred by spotty or inconsistent application
of balancing tests and by pseudo-empirical statements about the
importance of law enforcement and the sanctity of individual
liberty. We are all familiar with these rhetorical flourishes in
judicial opinions. Without seriously taking account of empirical
research, the Supreme Court strikes down rules of criminal pro-
cedure because they "fail to protect privacy ... and impede ef-
and more refinement to the concept of "voluntariness" embedded in the ideal of
consent. For instance, if a police officer has probable cause for a search, but no war-
rant, then perhaps we would balance the concept of voluntariness for consent in a
different way than if the police officer does not have probable cause, nor a search
warrant, but manages to elicit consent for the search anyway. The balance that we
might strike between liberty and order in the voluntariness assessment may be differ-
ent in different situations. Perhaps we might require a warning where the police have
no probable cause, but not where they do. The law of consent might be improved if
these kinds of considerations were included.
" See also, Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The 4th Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 72 GEo. L.J. 19, 46 (1988) (noting that "by candidly addressing
competing interests the Court encourages dialogue about the weight to be attached
to those interests") (citing Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the 1st Amendment:
Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REv. 821, 825 (1962) (making similar point)).
"See Dean M. Hashimoto, Science as Mythology in Constitution Law, 76 OREGON L.
REv. 111 (1997).
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fective law enforcement. ''26  The Court upholds other rules,
again without fully assessing the empirical evidence, because
they embody a "carefully crafted balance designed to fully pro-
tect both the defendant's and society's interests."27 We all rec-
ognize that these are, after all, purely rhetorical statements
intended to render authoritative the Court's decisions. Cases
where the Supreme Court relies solidly on social scientific evi-
dence-such as United States v. Leon 8-are few and far between,
and, curiously, are condemned by some legal academics simply
because they looked to such evidence.2
Recently, dissatisfaction with the balancing approach has
led one group of commentators to advocate a return to more
formalist modes of decision-making in criminal procedure, and
in legal and constitutional theory generally. Justice Antonin
Scalia has argued for, and implemented in his opinions, a form
of textualism in criminal procedure that focuses on the prac-
tices that prevailed at the time of the Founding." In determin-
ing whether a search and seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment, for example, Scalia has declared that the first in-
quiry must be "whether the action was regarded as an unlawful
search and seizure under the common law when the Amend-
ment was framed."3' It is only where the inquiry yields no an-
swer that Scalia will engage the balancing test. Similarly,
Professor Morgan Cloud has advocated greater formalism out of
a concern that the Court's pragmatic balancing approach sys-
2 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); see also United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411 (1976) ("[A] constitutional rule permitting felony arrests only with a warrant
or in exigent circumstances could severely hamper effective law enforcement."); Illi-
nois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (rejecting "two-prong test" [of Aguilar-Spinellh] be-
cause it "cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement").
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986).
28 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
' See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HAsTINGS L.J. 155 (1984); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the
Exclusionary Rule Rest on a 'Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16
CREiGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983); Albert Alschuler, Close Enough For Government Work:
The Exclusionary Rule AfterLeon, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 309.
' See generally Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATITER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); see, e.g.,
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
-" Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999).
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tematically tilts against protection of individual interests.
3 2
Cloud states, "[T] he Fourth Amendment embodies a normative
choice favoring individual autonomy over government authority
. . . only a rule-based interpretative theory can preserve that
choice."33
A second group of criminal procedure commentators-
those who subscribe to rights-oriented liberalism-also take
issue with the idea of balancing liberty interests against the
interests of law enforcement in formulating the scope of
constitutional rights. Although interpretive in nature, the idea
of "rights as trumps" does not necessarily allow for such
balancing of interests. The trump metaphor, naturally, comes
from Ronald Dworkin's description of rights-oriented
liberalism. Commentators in this camp resist weighing the
interests of law enforcement in defining the scope of rights. In
the Fifth Amendment context, for instance, Justice Thurgood
Marshall maintained that "whether society would be better off if
the police warned suspects of their rights before beginning an
interrogation or whether the advantages of giving such warnings
would outweigh their costs did not inform the Miranda
decision. "3 A large number of criminal procedure scholars also
hold this position, including, for instance, Stephen Schulhofer
and Charles Weisselberg.s Weisselberg writes that "Miranda
expressly represents a preference for Fifth Amendment values
over the interests of law enforcement officers in obtaining
incriminating statements," thereby implying that the contours
of the Fifth Amendment are determined absent a balancing of
law enforcement interests. 6 This is often referred to as the
"original vision" of Miranda by its proponents-a vision of the
2 See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment The-
ory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199 (1993).
Id. at 204.
'4 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 682 (1984) (Marshall,J, dissenting).
See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Ci. L. REV. 435, 436-37
(1987) (analyzing the two core holdings of Miranda without reference to law en-
forcement interests); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CoRNEIL L. REV.
109, 121 (1988).
36 Weisselberg, supra note 35, at 121; see also id at 140-41 (suggesting Fifth
Amendment values are complex, but do not include effective law enforcement).
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decision and the Fifth Amendment that focuses on individual
autonomy but disregards the interests of law enforcement.
A third group of commentators-including Michael Dorf,
37
David Faigman,' and Richard Posner--have called instead for
continued pragmatism accompanied by increased use of social
scientific and empirical studies in constitutional decision-
making, and, by implication, in constitutional criminal proce-
dure as well. At the more tepid end of the spectrum, in his
Foreword to the 1997 Term Michael Doff argues that the Court
has paid insufficient attention to social science research and to
the actual impact of the Court's decisions. Though not overly
sanguine, Doff does suggest that it would be a "step in the right
direction" and might result in "marginal improvements" for the
Supreme Court to take account of the social consequences of its
decisions.0 Dorf argues in his other work for a constitutional
approach of pragmatism-as-contextualism that wraps greater
empiricism within a more pragmatic constitutional decision-
41making process.
At the other end of the spectrum, David Faigman argues
that the Court traditionally has engaged in "constitutional fact-
finding" as a way to reach normative judgments in interpreting
the Constitution, and has increasingly been called upon to ex-
plain divergences between its judgments and empirical re-
search. 42 Faigman criticizes "the Court's empirical myopia" and
suggests that it may undermine the Court's political legitimacy."
He is somewhat more optimistic than Dorf about the potential
impact of increased attention to empirical research, and sug-
gests that constitutional fact-finding may in fact constrain the
"7 See Michael Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. Rtv. 4
(1998).
' See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empiri-
cal Component of onstitutionalInterpretation, 139 U. PA. L. R v. 541 (1991).
39 See Posner, supra note 8.
0 Dorf, supra note 37, at 8, 51; see generally id. at 51-60.
' See Michael Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593
(1999).
12 See Faigman, supra note 38, at 550.




In a similar vein, Richard Posner argues that the Supreme
Court should make greater use of the social sciences in constitu-
tional adjudication.45 Posner argues, against constitutional the-
ory and constitutional law theorists, that the weakness in the
Court's decisions lies not in a lack of theorizing, but in inatten-
tion to facts. On this ground, Posner recommends that "the le-
gal professoriat redirect its research and teaching efforts toward
fuller participation in the enterprise of social science, and by
doing this make social science a better aid to judges' under-
standing of the social problems that get thrust at them in the
form of constitutional issues. 46
A final group of commentators also take an empirical ap-
proach, but they come to yet a different conclusion. Commen-
tators such as Gerald Rosenberg4 7 and William Stuntz48 take the
position that criminal procedure rights-whether arrived at
through balancing, new formalism, or rights-oriented liberal-
ism-are ineffective in bringing about real change in the crimi-
nal justice system. They stress the importance of other factors-
popular support or legislative action for Rosenberg, substantive
criminal law and funding issues for Stuntz-in order to get a
better handle on the police-citizen relationship.
Our position makes room for both empiricism and inter-
pretivism. With the pragmatists and empiricists, we call for
greater attention to empirical and social science research. In
this respect, our position is simple: constitutional criminal pro-
cedure decision-making informed by the social sciences and
empirical research is better than lawmaking uninformed by
such research; and, in the criminal procedure realm, relevant
empirical data are available and knowable - perhaps not per-
fectly - but reasonably reliably. With the interpretivists, how-
ever, we contend that criminal procedure decision-making is a
"' See id. at 601.
45 SeePosner, supra note 8, at 11-12.
46 Id. at 12.
47 See GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CouRTs BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE, 304-35 (1991).
See WilliamJ. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Crimi-
naljustice, 107 YALE LJ. 1 (1997).
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function of interpretive judgment. The relevant empirical facts,
we claim, are not outcome determinative. They do not compel
particular resolutions, nor do they guarantee right answers.
The resolution of criminal procedure cases calls for normative
judgments-in particular, for a balancing of liberty and order-
and is not dictated by empirical evidence. When taken to-
gether, an emphasis on the use of relevant empirical facts in the
context of a pragmatic balancing approach to criminal proce-
dure decision-making, we believe, holds out the greatest prom-
ise of increasing the transparency of these constitutional
decisions and, therefore, potentially increasing the accountabil-
ity of the Court to the public.
At the level of constitutional theory, then, we endorse the
interpretive balancing-of-interests test that the Court so often
uses in criminal procedure. Although we do not necessarily
agree with the outcome that balancing may produce in the Su-
preme Court's hands, we endorse balancing as a jurisprudential
approach for two reasons. First, the reality is that, at least in
criminal law and procedure, we always do balance the costs to
law enforcement and personal security. So, for instance, we do
not prohibit all custodial interrogation in order to protect the
Fifth Amendment. Nor do we require proof beyond all possible
doubt. We always take into consideration the effects on the po-
lice function. Whether we like it or not, courts simply do adjust
the scope of rights based on those costs. Better that we should
be explicit about the balancing and articulate the interpretive
choice than deny the role of order interests and nevertheless
engage in balancing sub silentio.
Second, we endorse the balancing test because of the con-
ception of rights that it promotes. Defining the scope of a
criminal procedural right as a process of detecting the appro-
priate balance between societal interests in safety, on the one
hand, and freedom from unnecessary government intrusions,
on the other, envisions rights as flexible and contextual, as ac-
commodating of changes in political and social climate, and as
political and instrumental.49 Justice White eloquently expressed
'9 See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox of Un-
wanted Rights in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER CITY COMMUNITIES, SU-
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this conception of rights in his dissenting opinion in Miranda:
That the Court's holding today is neither compelled nor even strongly
suggested by the language of the Fifth Amendment... does not prove
either that the Court has exceeded its powers or that the Court is wrong
or unwise in its present reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment. It
does, however, underscore the obvious-that the Court has not discov-
ered or found the law in niaking today's decision, nor has it derived it
from some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to make new law and
new public policy in much the same way that it has in the course of in-
terpreting other great clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court
historically has done. Indeed, it is what it must do and will continue to
do until and unless there is some fundamental change in the constitu-
tional distribution of governmental powers.
5
0
This, we argue, is the right way to think about criminal pro-
cedure rights. In this field, at least, rights are a legal device that
we, as a society and through our courts, craft in order to pro-
mote a particular vision of society and of the police-citizen en-
counter. To be sure, we are not suggesting that the Court can
simply disregard the written text of the Constitution. The text
and history of the Constitution will, of course, exclude a vast
number of possible conceptions of rights. As Richard Posner
suggests, no constitutional theory "is required to determine how
many Senators each state may have., 5' Like Posner, we agree
that "there are large areas of constitutional law that the debates
over constitutional theory do not touch and that consequently
[we] shall ignore. 52 But in the difficult cases of criminal proce-
dure interpretation-cases, for instance, about what amounts to
reasonable suspicion or whether the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination extends to the police station house-the
scope of constitutional rights is more properly viewed as a vehi-
cle to promote a vision of society rather than an inherited or
cloistered stakehold. This way of thinking about rights em-
braces balancing as the procedural tool, as the decision-making
mechanism. Balancing recognizes societal interests in both lib-
pra note 6, at 6-11 (describing criminal procedure rights); see also Bernard E. Har-
court, Matrioshka Dolls in URGENT TIMES: POLIcING AND RIGHTS IN INNER CriY
CoMMuNImEs, supra note 6, at 81-82.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531.
51 Posner, supra note 8, at 2.
52 Ird
2000] 745
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erty and order, and articulates the resulting accommodation in
individual cases.
The primary purpose of this Foreword, though, is not to de-
fend this conception of rights. It is, instead, to call for greater
attention to social scientific and empirical research in constitu-
tional criminal procedure. The important point is that, even if
one were to adopt a more formalist or rights-oriented or other
jurisprudential approach to criminal procedure, the need for
greater empiricism remains just as strong. Reliance on evidence
about the real world in very real world criminal justice cases will
make these decisions better.
What we are calling for, then, is greater attention to social
science data regardless of the constitutional theory that one es-
pouses-not against constitutional theory. A helpful illustration
of decision-making informed by empirical research is the
Court's decision in United States v. Leon.53 Leon presented the
question whether evidence obtained in a search of the defen-
dant's home by police officers, who relied on a search warrant
that ultimately was found to be invalid, should be excluded.
The Court chose to resolve the question by "weighing the costs
and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case-in-
chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence."54 The benefit
of admitting such information is primarily that it brings to the
court's attention inherently trustworthy evidence that supports
the conviction of a criminal offender. Such convictions pro-
mote the maintenance of order.
The costs, of course, are bound up in the reasons for having
and enforcing the exclusionary rule in the first place. That rule
is designed to deter misconduct by police officers and to pre-
serve the integrity of the judicial forum. Consistent with the
Court's jurisprudence since the seventies, the Leon Court em-
phasized the goal of deterring police misconduct, and ulti-
mately ruled that the exclusion of evidence in these cases would
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Id. at 907.
' See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280 (1978); United States v.




not advance that goal.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied heavily on social
science studies. For example, Justice White, writing for the ma-
jority, pointed to nascent research on the effect of the exclu-
sionary rule on the disposition of felony arrests. Justice White
noted that the operation of the exclusionary rule appeared to
result in the nonprosecution or nonconviction of only a small
percentage of individuals, but he stated, "the small percentages
with which [the researchers] deal mask a large absolute number
of felons who are released because the cases against them were
based in part on illegal searches or seizures. '6 Justice White
then concluded that the potential for large numbers of felons to
go free militated against application of the exclusionary rule
where there was no basis-and where the Court had been of-
fered none-"to believe that exclusion of evidence.., will have
a significant deterring effect on the issuing judge or magis-
trate." '7
Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent emphasized con-
cern for the integrity of the judicial forum as the primary reason
to reject a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The
dissenters also pointed to empirical evidence-the same studies
relied upon by the majority -to argue that the costs of the ex-
clusionary rule were "quite low."59 By pointing to evidence sug-
gesting that the costs of the exclusionary rule were quite low,
the dissenters were in a better position to highlight the impor-
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 n. 6.
7 d. at 917.
' Both the majority and dissent relied upon Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know
(and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other
Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 A.B.F. Rs. J. 611 (1983); U.S. General Accounting Of-
fice, Report of the Comptroller General of the United States, Impact of the Exclu-
sionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions (1979); National Institute of Justice,
The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule: A Study in California (1982); Nardulli, The So-
cietal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 A.B.F. RES. J. 585
(1983); F. FEENEY, F. DILL, AND A. WEiR, ARREsrs WIHOUT CONvIGUONS: How OFTEN
THEY OCCUR AND WHY, NATIONAL INSTUTE OFJUSTICE (1983).
59 Leon, 468 U.S. 948. "Contrary to the claims of the rule's critics that exclusion
leads to 'the release of countless guilty criminals' [citations omitted], these studies
have demonstrated that federal and state prosecutors rarely drop cases because of po-
tential search and seizure problems." The dissenters go on to point out the ex-
tremely small percentages mentioned by the majority. Id.
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tance of their preferred justification for the rule-preservation
of the judicial forum-which is a rationale that does not depend
on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to
unconstitutional law enforcement conduct.
We need not decide here whether the majority or the dis-
sent made the stronger case. Rather, what impresses us about
Leon is the form of the inquiry and the Court's ready acceptance
of relevant "social authority" to inform and guide its balancing
analysis. The term "social authority" was developed by John
Monahan and Laurens Walker?° They argue that courts should,
when considering the relevant social science research, treat the
research in the same way that courts would treat legal precedent
under common law.6 ' The concept of social authority has sig-
nificant advantages, not the least of which is that it frees social
science from the category of "fact," which would be governed by
evidentiary rules, to the category of "law," which is subject to dif-
ferent rules and customs in judicial decision-making. Monahan
and Walker suggest that social science research takes on the
characteristics of fact when it is used in a case-specific way to ad-
62judicate an issue in a settled legal context. In contrast, they
argue that social science research should be treated more like
law when it can be used to address more general issues, 3 the
type of issues that we conceive within the balancing rubric. It is
the latter category of cases in which social science research takes
on the "future-oriented generality that case precedent pos-
sesses.
' ' 4
An authority-based rather than fact-based notion of social
science research does not require that social science be tied to
the particular facts of the case presented to an appellate court.
Rather, the empirical and social science research is as general as
legal precedent. As a result, it is unnecessary to create new bur-
6' SeeJohn Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 488 (1986).
6' See id. at 488.





dens of proof or production with regard to the research.0 The
burden of proof issues are unchanged by the introduction of
social science research. So, for example, sociological research
about the relationship between disadvantaged minorities and
the police introduced in a case to explain the connection be-
tween flight from a police officer and guilt of crime is also rele-
vant to an assessment of a minority individual's waiver of her
right to remain silent under Miranda. Undoubtedly a reading of
this research will improve anyone's commonsense judgments
about human behavior-even the judgments of a Supreme
CourtJustice.
Leon is an excellent example of the Monahan and Walker
concept of social authority at work to promote the value of
transparency in adjudication. Both the majority and the dis-
senters are relying on the same study, but each side uses the
study to promote a different viewpoint concerning the value of
the exclusionary rule. It is easy to see how each side strikes the
balance between liberty and order. In Leon, the interpretive
choices are made clear-are transparent-because the justices
set forth and discuss the empirical backdrop against which they
are deciding.
It is important to note, again, that we are using the Leon de-
cision as an illustration not for its outcome, but for its mode of
legal analysis. Indeed, for our purposes here, if we had to side
with anyone, we would side with Justice Blackmun. In his con-
currence, Justice Blackmun wrote separately to "underscore
what [he] regarde [d] as the unavoidably provisional nature" of
the decision.6Justice Blackmun noted that the Court "narrowed
the scope of the exclusionary rule because of an empirical
judgement that the rule has little appreciable effect in cases
where officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on search
warrants." 67 Justice Blackmun went on to state that the provi-
sional nature of empiricism invites testing and the prospect of
change. "The logic of a decision that rests on untested predic-
6' See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal
Precedent, 76 CAL. L. R v. 877 (1988).
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tions about police conduct demands no less."' We would em-
phasize that "provisional" is not a bad thing, but rather a virtue.
It is the fulfillment of the promise of American legal realism. As
Erickson and Simon suggest, "Science is by nature innovative,
but the law resists innovation."6 9
II. THE DICamhSONAND WARDLOWOPINIONS
All too often, the Supreme Court resolves criminal proce-
dure cases without considering the social scientific or empirical
research. In this respect, the 1999 Term was business as usual.
Without so much as discussing or even citing in a footnote the
considerable research that has been conducted on police custo-
dial interrogation in the 1990s, the Chief Justice, writing for a
seven-member majority in Dickerson v. United States, concluded
that there was no adequate justification for overruling the re-
quirement of Miranda warnings. Without mentioning or even
referencing recent research, the Chief Justice wrote that cases
decided subsequent to Miranda "have reduced the impact of the
Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement."70
Writing for the Court in Wardlow as well, the Chief Justice
acknowledged the empirical nature of the question-whether
flight from a police officer amounted to reasonable suspicion-
but stated that there were "no available empirical studies deal-
ing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior."'" As a re-
sult, the Chief Justice maintained, the Court had to rely on its
own "commonsense judgements about human behavior."72 In
the Court's opinion, "headlong flight-wherever it occurs-is
the consummate act of evasion. "73
These types of assertions, however, are not self-evident,
common sense, or simple "facts of life." They are contested
empirical claims that are hotly debated in legal and social scien-
Id. at 928.
69 ROSEMARYJ. ERICKSON AND RITAJ. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 9 (1998).7o Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).




FOREWORD: TRANSPARENT AD]UDICA TION
tific circles. There are data and studies that discuss these em-
pirical issues. In the Dickerson context, for example, relevant re-
search suggests that the Miranda warnings have been effective in
apprising accused persons, and the general public, of their right
of silence.7 4 Other research has revealed that police interroga-
tors have learned to minimize the giving of Miranda warnings-
in certain situations, to use the Miranda procedures as a way to
elicit confessions that they otherwise would not have obtained.*
This may undermine the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings
in ensuring the continuous opportunity to exercise the right to
silence. Clearly, this empirical research is relevant to whether
the Miranda procedures are an effective means of protecting the
privilege against self-incrimination.
Similarly, there is also readily available data that can help to
assess the strength of the inference of guilt to be drawn from
flight from a police officer. The dissenters in Wardlow cited re-
search that called into question the emphatic nature of the ma-
jority's claim regarding flight when those evading police are
members of minority groups. But, even the dissenters did not
review the most comprehensive analysis of urban street stops to
date, published by the New York Office of the Attorney General
("OAG Report") . This report easily bolsters the dissenters'
claim that the racial dynamics that exist in urban areas between
police and citizens makes the connection between flight from a
police officer and guilt less straightforward than one might oth-
erwise think.
Moreover, the New York OAG Report provides information
71 See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621, 652-53 (1996); Paul G. Cassel & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s:
An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 889 (1996); SPECIAL
COMMIrTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
CRIMINALJUSTICE IN CRIsis 28 (1988);John Gruhl & Cassia Spohn, The Supreme Court's
Post-Miranda Rulings: Impact on Local Prosecutors, 3 LAw & POL'Y Q 29 (1981); SAMUEL
WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINALJUSTCE 1950-
1990, at 51 (1993);Jeffrey Tobin, Viva Miranda, NEWREPUBUIC, Feb. 16, 1987, at 11.
7' See Richard A. Leo and Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modem Interrogators'
StrategiesforDealing with Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 413 (1999).
71 See The New York City Police Department's "Stop & Frisk" Practices: A Report to
the People of the State of New York From the Office Of The Attorney General, Dec.
1, 1999, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop-frisk/stopfrisk.html.
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that allows an assessment of just how reliably different catego-
ries of reasons for police stops translate into arrests. Because
one of the categories of reasons for stops collected in the New
York report is flight, it is possible to compare the reliability of
flight from a police officer as a reason for stopping someone to
a category for which the courts have historically been more con-
fident of reliability.
We contend that this empirical research is central to prop-
erly resolving the questions presented in these constitutional
criminal procedure cases. We turn to these two decisions from
the 1999 Term-Dickerson v. United States and Illinois v. Ward-
low--to demonstrate how the Court should have utilized social
science and empirical research and how doing so would have
improved the Court's constitutional decision-making. Our goal
here is to demonstrate, first, that research relevant to the cen-
tral legal questions presented in those cases existed, and sec-
ond, that the research would have assisted the Court in
understanding the constitutional landscape and resolving the
cases in a more transparent way. We will begin with Dickerson v.
United States.
A. DICKERSON V. UNITED STATES
The seeds of the Dickerson litigation were sown in 1968, two
years after the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,
when Congress passed Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act. Within Title II was a provision, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3501, that essentially displaced the general rule, set
forth in Miranda, that any statements obtained during the
course of police custodial interrogation be excluded from ad-
mission in the prosecutor's case-in-chief unless Miranda warn-
ings were given prior to the interrogation. In the place of the
Miranda procedure (warnings, waiver, and exclusion) Congress
enacted a totality-of-the-circumstances test that focused on the
voluntariness of the statement. Congress specified a list of cir-
cumstances that the trial court should consider, including at
least three of the four Miranda warnings, whether the defendant
knew the nature of the charges against him, the length of de-
tention, and whether defense counsel was present during the
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interrogation." Although President Johnson signed the legisla-
tion inJune 1968,78 most administrations-with the exception of
Attorneys General John Mitchell in 1969 and Ed Meese in
1986-ignored section 3501."
The question presented in Dickerson was whether the proce-
dure for the admission of statements under 18 U.S.C. § 3501
trumps the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before
interrogation. The Court did not grant certiorari on whether to
reverse the two core holdings of Miranda-namely, first, that
compulsion, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, is not lim-
ited to "legal compulsion" but extends to police custodial inter-
rogation; and second, that police custodial interrogation is
inherently compulsive. 8° And the Fourth Circuit did not-and,
of course, could not-reverse the two core constitutional hold-
ings of Miranda. The question presented in Dickerson, as a re-
sult, was a narrow one, focusing on the Miranda procedures
(warnings, waiver, and exclusion) rather than on the larger con-
stitutional holdings.
It was further narrowed by the fact that the principal parties
to the Dickerson litigation"'-Charles Dickerson, the United
States government, and Paul Cassell as court-appointed amicus
curiae--as well as most legal scholars," agreed that the specific
7See 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
71 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 History (1999); Max Frankel, President Signs Broad Crime Bill,
With Objections, N.Y. TIME, June 20, 1968, at Al, A23.
2 The legislative and subsequent history of section 3501 is recounted in several ar-
ticles, see e.g. Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule"Miranda2, 85 CORNELL L. REv.
883, 887-909, 925-31 (2000); Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 US.C. §
3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWAL. REV. 175 (1999).
" See Schulhofer, supra note 35, at 436; Kamisar, supra note 79, at 942; Weisselberg,
supra note 35, at 112.
" See Brief for the United States at *28, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326
(2000), (No. 99-5525) (available at 2000 WL 141075); Brief of Petitioner at *14, Dick-
erson v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000), (No. 99-5525) (available at 2000 WL
142076); Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at *23, Dickerson (No. 99-5525).
12 Most scholars agree that the warnings protect the Fifth Amendment, but are not
carved into stone. Stephen Schulhofer, an ardent defender of the Miranda warnings,
writes, for instance: "What the Tucker passages and similar dicta mean to emphasize is
not that the Miranda requirements can be altered or abandoned at will, but only that
the specifics of the Miranda approach can be modified or replaced ifa state provides
equivalent protection to the suspect." Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect, at 554; see
also Kamisar, supra note 79, at 911-13, 940-41; Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege
in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MCH-. L. REV. 2625, 2630 n.19
(1996); Weisselberg, supra note 35, at 121-22.
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procedure set forth in Miranda was not the only procedure that
would possibly satisfy constitutional requirements. The parties
agreed that the Miranda warnings were intended to protect the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and that,
in this sense, they were not themselves exclusively dictated by the
Fifth Amendment. 83 This followed logically from the Court's in-
vitation in Miranda to Congress and the states to implement dif-
ferent safeguards. The Court had written, in a now famous
passage:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting
the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the ex-
ercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say
that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular so-
lution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is
presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional
straightjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it in-
tended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to
continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protect-
ing the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of
our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures
which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right
of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the
[Miranda] safeguards must be observed.
84 o
This passage-inserted by Chief Justice Earl Warren at the
suggestion of Justice William Brennans -clearly communicated
that alternative measures could displace the Miranda proce-
dures under certain specified circumstances, namely if the
measures were at least as or more effective at making accused per-
sons aware of their right to silence and assuring a continuous
opportunity to invoke the right to silence.
Where the parties to the Dickerson litigation did disagree was
on the even narrower question of whether the Miranda proce-
dures were a constitutional floor or, instead, were above the
floor necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment. The govern-
"' See, e.g., Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at *3, Dickerson (No. 99-5525).
("The rule was an exercise by the Court of its power to devise, in the absence of legis-
lation, prophylactic measures that may extend beyond constitutional requirements in
order to protect the underlying constitutional right.")
Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 1624.
" See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNEU L. REv. 109, 123-25
(1998); Yale Kamisar, supra note 79, at 883, 940.
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ment and Dickerson argued that the Miranda warnings were the
minimum acceptable safeguards, and that anything less would
automatically violate the Fifth Amendment. Court-appointed
amicus, on the other hand, viewed the Miranda warnings as
"overprotective and extraconstitutional. '8 6
In Cassell's view, the Miranda rule of automatic exclusion of
un-Mirandized statements "extends beyond the Fifth Amend-
ment's bar on actually compelled statements," is a "more sweep-
ing, albeit prophylactic, measure," and, therefore, is not itself
required by the Constitution. The crux of the disagreement
was in amicus curiae's use of the words "more" or "extra." As ami-
cus argued, "Congress of course has no authority to... abrogate
a judicially devised protective measure essential to the survival
of a constitutional right. But that is very different from saying
that Congress likewise has no authority to modify a ruling that
'overprotects' a constitutional right, as is clearly the case with
Miranda's automatic rule excluding all unwarned statements. "
Given the specific language of the Miranda opinion, espe-
cially the now-famous passage previously quoted, as well as the
fact that the Court applied the Miranda procedure to the states,
it is clear that the Supreme Court in Miranda viewed the warn-
ings as a constitutional minimum, rather than as extra-
constitutional safeguards. As Yale Kamisar has argued, the
stronger argument for section 3501 dates to the period its pas-
sage, and to the post-Warren Court decisions-Michigan v.
Tucker, New York v. Quarles, and Oregon v. Elstad-in which the
Court recharacterized the Miranda procedures as having less
than constitutional pedigree."' The Supreme Court in Dickerson
could have held that those subsequent cases had overruled
Miranda. Similarly, the Court in Dickerson could have overruled
Miranda, struck a difference balance, and required different
safeguards.9° Cassell's fallback position in his amicus curiae brief
Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae, supra note 81, at *3.
97 Id. at *3, *7-8, *10.
" Id at *12.
89 See Kamisar, supra note 79, at 936.
90 See George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road forMiranda v. Arizona?: On the His-
tory and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 15 (2000) (argu-
ing that the Court could have decided to rewrite the last sentence of that passage).
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called on the Court to do just that.91 But it is clear from the lan-
guage of Miranda and its application to the states that Congress
did not have the authority, prior to those post-3501 Supreme
Court decisions, to simply disregard the express language in
Miranda, restrike the balance that Miranda had struck, and de-
clare that less protective measures were now sufficient. To do
otherwise would ignore the entire concept ofjudicial review.
Thus, the Dickerson case raised two narrow and interrelated
questions. The first question was whether the procedures in
section 3501 were "at least as effective in apprising accused per-
sons of their right of silence and in assuring the continuous op-
portunity to exercise it." If so, then the 3501 procedures
satisfied Miranda. The second question was whether the Court
should revisit the balance that it had struck in Miranda and re-
quire different safeguards.
1. Whether the procedures in section 3501 are "at least
as effective" as Miranda warnings
The interpretive choices raised by the first question in Dick-
erson had already been made in Miranda. In requiring Miranda
warnings, the Court effectively had balanced the interests of per-
sonal liberty from compelled self-incrimination against the effi-
cient enforcement of the criminal law. After all, the Court in
Miranda did not require the presence of counsel in custodial in-
terrogation, nor did it prohibit all custodial interrogation out-
right. These outcomes would have better protected the right
against compelled self-incrimination if the interests of liberty
alone had determined the scope of the right. But the Court in-
stead weighed the interests of law enforcement. It is in this
sense that, as Justice O'Connor has stated, "as any reading of
Miranda reveals, the decision ... embodies a carefully crafted
balance designed to fully protect both the defendant's and soci-
ety's interests."92 Yale Kamisar, one of Miranda's staunchest sup-
porters, has similarly stated that Miranda is based on "an
arguing that "[t]his would of course amount to overruling part of Miranda's holding,
but it would stop short of overruling the case entirely.").
" See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae, supra note 81, at *40.




interpretation of the self-incrimination clause and a judgment
about how to strike the appropriate balance between the needs
of law enforcement and the rights of custodial suspects.93 In
fact, referring to Justice O'Connor's comments in Moran v.
Burbine, Kamisar writes that "this is the way Miranda's defend-
ers-not its critics-have talked about the case for the past
three decades."''
The Court in Miranda specifically set forth an empirical test
to determine whether other procedures could displace the
Miranda warnings, namely whether alternative measures were at
least as effective as the Miranda warnings. The notion of "effec-
tiveness" was defined by the Court in Miranda as "apprising ac-
cused persons of their right of silence and . . . assuring a
continuous opportunity to exercise it." As a result, the first
question in Dickerson raised a relatively straightforward empirical
issue: is section 3501 at least as effective as the Miranda proce-
dures? Although we do not have empirical evidence regarding
the effectiveness of a post-Miranda section 3501 regime, we do
have relevant research concerning the effectiveness of the
Miranda warnings and can draw some inferences from that evi-
dence.
The relevant empirical and social scientific research on po-
lice interrogation (under the existing Miranda procedures) sug-
gests that, in virtually all observed police custodial
interrogations, the police inform suspects of their Miranda
rights. Richard Leo has conducted extensive field work inside
the criminal investigation division of a large police department
in an urban setting with a population of about 375,000 and a
" Kamisar, supra note 79, at 918; see also Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Crimi-
nal Justice, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECIVE 116, 120 (B. Schwartz ed., 1996).
Kamisar calls this balancing a theoretical or normative judgment, in contrast to an
empiricaljudgment. See Kamisar, supra note 79, at 918, nn. 181, 183. In our opinion,
it is instead a normative judgment that needs to be based on solid empirical evi-
dence-and in this sense is a mixed empirical and normative decision.
"' Kamisar, supra note 79, at 952; see also, Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of
the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the Burger Court: in THE BURGERYEARS: RIGHTS
AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT, 1969-1986 143, 150 (Herman Schwartz ed.,
1987).
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minority population of about 72%.95 Leo sat in on 122 interro-
gations. Leo also reviewed the videotapes of sixty additional in-
terrogations conducted in two separate areas with populations
around 120,000.96 Leo found that detectives provided Miranda
warnings in all of the cases in which they were required (in 175
out of 182 (or 96%) of the total cases observed) .7
In a study conducted by Paul Cassell involving 173 interro-
gations in Salt Lake City in 1994, Cassell found only one clear
case and two arguable cases of non-compliance with the re-
quirement of Miranda warnings. 98 Another study, conducted in
1981, which reviewed litigation records, similarly found few de-
viations from the Miranda procedures. 99 The American Bar As-
sociation conducted a randomized telephone survey of over 800
judges, prosecutors and police officers, and the police officers
surveyed indicated that they consistently comply with Miranda
warnings.1°°
Accordingly, relevant evidence suggests that the Miranda
procedure has resulted in near-universal notification of rights in
the custodial context. Moreover, as a result of the requirement
of Miranda warnings and the popular diffusion of the warnings
through the media and popular culture, many people today
know their Miranda rights.10' A national poll conducted in 1991
indicated that 80% of respondents knew that they have a right
to remain silent if arrested. 0 2 An earlier national poll in 1984
'5 See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
266, 268 (1996).
See id. at 268, 268 nn. 14-15.
9 See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621, 652-53 (1996).
' See, e.g. Paul G. Cassel & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Em-
pirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 889 (1996) (in study of 219
arrests, involving 173 interrogations, there was only one clear case of Miranda non-
compliance).
9 SeeJohn Gruhl & Cassia Spohn, The Supreme Court's Post-Miranda Rulings: Impact
on Local Prosecutors, 3 LAW& POL'YQ 29 (1981).
'0 See SPECIAL COMMrITEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN CRISIS 28 (1988).
"0, See Leo, supra note 97, at 651; Paul Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical
Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 450-451 (1996).
'0, See SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINALJUSTIcE 1950-1990, at 51 (1993).
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found that 93% of the persons surveyed knew that they had a
right to counsel if arrested.'03
To be sure, proponents of section 3501 contend that police
interrogators likely would continue to inform suspects of their
rights under a 3501 regime.'4 While some law enforcement
agencies and individual interrogators may well have continued
giving Miranda warnings under a section 3501 procedure, there
is not a good reason to believe that compliance would be equal
to the present Miranda regime, since 3501, in contrast to
Miranda, does not require automatic exclusion. In other words,
section 3501 does not provide an equal incentive over the long-
term or over the complete range of cases for police interroga-
tors to inform all suspects of their right to silence.
Current research also suggests that the Miranda procedures
are effective, as well, in assuring the accused an opportunity to
exercise their right of silence. In Richard Leo's study of 182 in-
terrogations, approximately 75% of the suspects waived their
Miranda rights in response to receiving their Miranda warnings,
about 21% invoked their rights, while another 4% did not re-
ceive Miranda warnings because it was not believed that they
were technically in custody for purposes of Miranda'05 Exclud-
ing the cases where Miranda was not believed to be required,
78% of the suspects waived and 22% of the suspects invoked
their Miranda rights.
In Cassell's study in Salt Lake City, twenty-one suspects (or
16.3% of suspects given Miranda warnings) invoked their rights
initially.' °6 Paul Cassell has compiled the available historical
data from post-Miranda studies concerning rates of invocation
of Miranda rights and, although they vary considerably, found
that they average somewhere around 20%-which is consistent
with the more recent Leo and Salt Lake studies.0 7 Again, while
there is scarce empirical evidence concerning a post-Miranda
113 SeeJeffrey Tobin, Viva Miranda, NEw REPUBuC, Feb. 16, 1987, at 11.
04 See, e.g., Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae, Dickerson (No. 99-5525); Govern-
ment Brief Dickerson (No. 99-5525).
'0- See Richard A. Leo, supra note 95, at 275 tbl.2.
'0' See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 98, at 860.
107 See Cassell, supra note 101 at 495 and n.623.
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section 3501 regime, there is not a good reason to believe that a
regime like section 3501-a regime that does not explicitly re-
quire notification of the right to silence, express waiver of the
right to silence or automatic exclusion-would be equally effec-
tive in assuring the continuous opportunity to exercise the right
to silence. Again, section 3501 does not give police interroga-
tors an equal incentive to provide Miranda-type warnings to all
accused persons in custody.
As an empirical matter, then, the first question is relatively
straightforward. In this respect, we agree with Yale Kamisar that
this empirical inquiry need not detain us for very long. As Ka-
misar explains:
Section 3501 does not contain a video taping or audio taping require-
ment, or anything else even arguably constituting an effective alternative
to the Miranda safeguards.... It is hard to see how anyone can seriously
argue that the Miranda Court encouraged or invited Congress to abolish
Miranda in favor of the very test the Court had explicitly and emphati-
cally found inadequate to protect the rights of suspects.
Some commentators argue, however, that this first empirical
question need not detain us at all and that we do not even need
to consider any empirical evidence, since it is so clear from the
legislative intent of section 3501 that Congress meant to elimi-
nate the Miranda warnings and return to the prior, less protec-
tive Due Process test. The argument goes something like this:
in Miranda, the Court held that the Due Process voluntariness
test was not sufficiently effective in apprising accused persons of
the right to silence and therefore required Miranda warnings as
a more effective procedure. By returning to the voluntariness
standard in section 3501, Congress intentionally enacted a pro-
cedure that was less effective than Miranda. Congress does not
have the authority to overrule Miranda in this way.
Moreover, there is no need for empirical research since the
voluntariness regime embodied in section 3501 is by definition
less effective than the Miranda warnings. Even if recent studies
reveal that the Miranda warnings are less effective than the
Court had hoped in 1966, the section 3501 regime would still be
108 Kamisar, supra n. 79 at 912-13.
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less effective than Miranda warnings and therefore not an ac-
ceptable substitute. There is, accordingly, no need to review
any empirical evidence, first because of Congress' intent and
second because section 3501 is per se less effective than Miranda
warnings.
The Chief Justice in Dickerson in fact articulated both of
these arguments as justification for reversing the Fourth Circuit.
The ChiefJustice noted, first, that "Congress intended by its en-
actment to overrule Miranda" and held that "Congress may not
legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying
the Constitution. ' 9 Second, the ChiefJustice wrote that section
3501 "explicitly eschews a requirement of pre-interrogation
warnings" and therefore is per se no "adequate substitute for the
warnings required by Miranda." "o
As to the first part of the argument, we would respond that
there is no good reason to privilege Congressional intent-a
nebulous conception to begin with-over the reality of contem-
porary police interrogation. The fact is that, in the last thirty-
five years, police practices have changed. The first question
posed to us today by Dickerson--in contrast to the first question
which would have been posed if Dickerson had reached the
Court in 1968 or 1969-is whether a section 3501 regime in
2000 is likely to be at least as effective as the Miranda warnings
as envisaged in 1966. Surely, if there were solid contemporary
evidence that, during the past thirty years, the federal courts
had vigorously enforced the voluntariness standard incorpo-
rated in section 3501 to the point where it actually was more ef-
fective than the Miranda warnings, then we would have reached
a different result in Dickerson.' To be sure, there is no such
'" Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2332.
"o Id. at 2335.
... Several commentators have argued that the Miranda warnings have in fact had
the inverse impact-namely, that Miranda may have undermined judicial scrutiny of
the voluntariness of statements pursuant to the Due Process clause. George Thomas,
Richard Leo and Alfredo Garcia have highlighted the fact that "the routinized
Miranda ritual lulls judges into admitting confessions with little inquiry into volun-
tariness." George Thomas, The End of the Road at 18-21; Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda
Dead, Was It Overruled, OrIs It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 461, 499-502 (1998);
Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in
America, 18 CRIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 35, 44 (1992); Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the
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evidence. But, as a matter of constitutional theory, there is no
good reason to privilege authorial intent from 1968 over the
empirical realities of 2000.
With regard to the second part of the argument, we would
emphasize that it rests on an empirical assumption. To be sure,
an empirical assumption shared by most people, and particu-
larly by the Court in 1966 and most members of Congress in
1968. But an empirical assumption nonetheless. That empiri-
cal assumption is that the Miranda warnings are per se more ef-
fective than the voluntariness standard. If Congress had
enacted any other type of alternative procedure other than the
due process test that Miranda expressly displaced, then pre-
sumably most commentators would agree that the case did raise
an empirical question. If next year Congress were to enact a
video-taping provision or to require the presence of counsel in
custodial interrogation, then surely we would have to examine
the empirical question whether video taping or the presence of
counsel is likely to be as effective as the Miranda procedure. In
this sense, the first question in Dickerson does raise an empirical
question. An easy one, perhaps. But an empirical question
nonetheless.
2. Whether the Court should revisit the balance struck in Miranda and
require a different procedural regime.
The second question raised by Dickerson is far more chal-
lenging both as a normative and empirical matter. The second
question effectively asks whether the Court should revisit the
balance between the liberty and order interests that it struck
when it required Miranda warnings in 1966. This question calls
for a balancing-of-interests jurisprudential approach informed
by the most current and reliable empirical and social science
Problem of False Confessions, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSnCE AND POLICING 276-77
(Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas, III, eds., 1998). Oncejudges are satisfied that
the suspect was informed of his rights and waived them, the subsequent voluntariness
analysis may become proforma, they suggest. The result could be that more suspects
are being compelled to self-incriminate by means of police trickery and deceit that
would not be condoned absent the Miranda warnings. This is a provocative and in-
teresting thesis that is relevant to the analysis here. It is, however, at this point ex-
tremely speculative and has not been empirically assessed. This further underscores
our call for more empirical research in the criminal procedure area.
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evidence concerning the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings
and their effect on the efficient enforcement of the criminal
law.
In the Dickerson opinion, the Chief Justice treated this ques-
tion in three short paragraphs that nowhere addressed available
research on police interrogation. The Chief Justice relied pri-
marily on the justification of stare decisis. He found no special
justification to depart from the Miranda procedures, declaring
that "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice
to the point where the warnings have become part of our na-
tional culture."11 2 In addition, the Chief Justice added-in a fa-
miliar rhetorical flourish-that "our subsequent cases have
reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law en-
forcement .... " 13
We contend that the Court's opinion and decision-making
would have been more transparent and well reasoned-and
thereby more convincing and legitimate-if the Court had con-
sidered and assessed the relevant research, and explicitly articu-
lated its normative judgment about the propriety of the Miranda
warnings in relation to the relevant social science research.
There exists research that the Court should have considered
and referenced in its opinion that gives some measure of the ef-
fectiveness and costs to law enforcement of the Miranda warn-
ings. That research is relevant in deciding whether to continue
requiring Miranda procedures. It informs the balancing-of-
interests analysis. And it renders more transparent the choices
that the Court is making in continuing to require Miranda warn-
ings.
a) Research regarding the effectiveness of the Miranda
warnings in protecting the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.
We have already reviewed relevant research that indicates
that the Miranda warnings are effective in apprising accused
persons, as well as the general public, of their right to silence
and in assuring an opportunity to exercise that fight. There is,
112 Dickerson, 120 S.Ct. at 2336.
113 Id
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however, additional evidence that the Court should have taken
into consideration.
On the one hand, in further support of the effectiveness of
Miranda warnings, there is evidence that Miranda procedures
have resulted in a lower frequency of police interrogation of
suspects. Lower rates of police interrogation mean, naturally, a
lower probability of possibly compelled self-incrimination. Paul
Cassell's study of contemporary police practices in Salt Lake
City shows that, of his sample of 219 suspects arrested, the po-
lice only questioned 173, or 79% of the suspects. Twenty-one
percent were not questioned. These results parallel another
study, conducted in 1979, which revealed that the police in
Jacksonville, Florida, did not question 18.5% of arrested bur-
glary suspects, and that the police in San Diego, California, did
not question 20.1% of such suspects. Cassell argues that pre-
Miranda interrogation rates were much higher and that the dif-
ferential may be due to the requirement of Miranda warnings."
4
A reduction in the rate of interrogation of suspects, if attribut-
able to the Miranda warnings, naturally would correspond to
more protection of the right against compelled self-
incrimination.
On the other hand, there is countervailing research that
suggests that police interrogators have adapted to the Miranda
regime and are now better able to minimize the Miranda warn-
ings and avoid invocation of the right to silence. This research
undermines the claim of Miranda's effectiveness in assuring an
accused the continuous opportunity to fully exercise their right
of silence. The thirty-five years since Miranda have brought
numerous "refinements" in police interrogation techniques.
Leading manuals in police interrogation-like Fred Inbau, John
Reid andJoseph Buckley's third and newest edition of CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS-describe some of the more
successful techniques at eliciting waivers and incriminating
statements. Many of the police tactics prescribed by interroga-
tion experts are specifically aimed at increasing the level of
compulsion in the interrogation room in order to make it more
. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 98, at 854-58.
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likely that the suspect waive her Miranda rights.15 Many of the
strategies involve psychological ploys intended to reduce
Miranda invocations. 16
Richard Leo describes the most prevalent strategies: condi-
tioning (creating a relaxed, friendly and concerned environ-
ment conducive to waiving Miranda rights); de-emphasizing the
importance of the Miranda warnings (blending the warnings
into the conversation or calling the warnings a formality); and
persuasion (convincing the suspect that it is in her best interest
to talk to police) . These strategies are often deployed in what
Leo refers to as a confidence game, where the police interroga-
tor seeks to induce confidence and trust from the suspect in ex-
change for hope of a better future for the suspect."" To be sure,
some of these strategies are simply violations of Miranda, such
as, for instance, when experts recommend against giving
Miranda warnings too early in the questioning; 9 but many other
of these investigative strategies are not necessarily outright viola-
tions of Miranda.
Even more, Richard Leo and Welsh White have suggested
that giving Miranda warnings in certain cases may actually put
suspects at ease and thereby elicit confessions that would not
otherwise have been obtained. The theory here is that by mak-
ing suspects feel more comfortable in the interrogation setting,
the increased level of comfort may decrease their guard and
thereby result in more confessions. In Adapting to Miranda, Leo
and White present evidence-excerpts of interrogation tran-
scripts collected over the past twelve years-of situations where,
in their opinion, the giving of Miranda warnings are actually
"' See, e.g., INBAU et al., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 29-34 (3d. ed.
1986) (describing the type of interrogation room that increases suspect's anxiety).
"d See also research on the social psychology of confessions, including LAWRENCE
WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM (1993); Saul M. Kassin
& Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, Internatiza-
tion, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. Sci. 125 (1996); Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall,
Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Im-
plication, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233 (1991).
.. See Leo, supra note 97, at 660-65.
218 See generally Richard Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence
Game, 30 Law & Society Review 259, 264-66 (1996).
"9 See INBAu et al., supra note 115, at 224-25 (discussing delayed warnings).
2000] 765
766 TRACEYL. MEARES & BERNARD E. HARCOURT [Vol. 90
used as a way to elicit confessions. These are situations where,
in their words, "interrogators are sometimes able to present the
Miranda warnings so that suspects are led to believe that waiving
their Miranda rights will be to their advantage."12
As a result, some commentators suggest that the Miranda
warnings may no longer exert much influence in the interroga-
tion setting. George Thomas has scrutinized the evidence and
concludes that the Miranda warnings have "largely failed" to
protect suspects and control police interrogation: "guilty sus-
pects who see no' benefit in talking to the police will refuse to
cooperate whether they receive Miranda warnings or not ....
Guilty suspects who can be tricked into making damaging
statements by the police can also be tricked into waiving their
Miranda rights."
2'
b) Research regarding the effect of Miranda warnings on
the efficient enforcement of the criminal law.
There is also relevant research concerning the effect of the
Miranda regime on law enforcement behavior. Although, again,
we do not have empirical evidence regarding a post-Miranda
section 3501 regime, we do have analogous evidence about the
impact on law enforcement of the Miranda warnings as com-
pared to a regime without Miranda warnings similar to section
3501. The procedure enacted in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is practically
identical to the totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness test
that the courts employed before the Miranda decision-and
continue to employ today-in Due Process challenges to the
admission of defendants' out-of-court statements.
Like the Due Process standard, section 3501 adopts the le-
gal standard of voluntariness, as well as a totality-of-the-
circumstances approach. Section 3501 specifically lists a num-
ber of factors that the reviewing court must consider, all of
which were already reflected in the due process standard in
1966. Two of the five factors listed in section 3501 involve
whether specific Miranda warnings were given. The Supreme
Court and lower federal courts had held, prior to and subse-
quent to Miranda, that the failure to give Miranda-type warnings
,0 Leo & White, supra note 75, at 413.
"1 Thomas, supra note 90, at 4.
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was a relevant circumstance to be considered in the due process
analysis. 2 Two other factors listed in section 3501 include the
time that elapsed between arrest and arraignment and whether
the defendant knew of the nature of the offense. Both of these
two factors-the time elapsed'2 and knowledge of the nature of
the offense 24--were also traditionally part of the Due Process
'2 In Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1963), for example, the Court
wrote that ""there [is no] indication in the record that prior to signing the written
confession, or even thereafter, Haynes was advised by authorities of his right to re-
main silent, warned that his answers might be used against him, or told of his rights
respecting consultation with an attorney." See also Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 635 (1961) (due process precludes use of confession obtained after prolonged
period of questioning and when defendant was not apprised of right to remain silent
and right to an attorney); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (due process
violation occurred where police officers failed to advise defendant of his right to re-
main silent and right to counsel while holding him incommunicado for three days);
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 65 (1949) (failure to inform defendant of right
to remain silent and interrogation for five consecutive days without aid of counsel vio-
lates due process); see also cases cited in Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at
*16 n.11.
'" In Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 65 (1951), for instance, the Supreme
Court recognized that "prolonged detention without a charge of crime or without
preliminary appearance before a magistrate" is a factor in its due process analysis.
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Wade v. Jackson, 256 F.2d 7, 14 (2d Cir. 1958), the
Second Circuit court observed that .. [t]aking a man to the state police barracks,
keeping him incommunicado for 23 hours during which he is permitted no sleep,
with no food whatsoever, and only two glasses of liquid after many hours, submitting
him to constant questioning despite his denials, is not only degrading and uncivilized
but it is obviously coercive." The court went on to conclude that the 23-hour delay
was far more than was reasonably necessary for investigation, and, therefore, that
Wade's statements were involuntary. Id. at 16. See also, e.g., Turner v. Pennsylvania,
338 U.S. 62, 64 (1949) (delay in preliminary hearing considered as factor in due pro-
cess analysis); Pugh v. State of North Carolina, 238 F. Supp. 721, 724 (E.D.N.C. 1965)
(due process violated where defendant held in custody for ten days prior to arraign-
ment without the opportunity to consult with counsel); see also cases cited in Brief for
the United States, supra note 81, at *17 n.12.
'" There was much confusion in Dickerson and in related academic debate as to
whether this factor was part of the Due Process analysis pre- or post-Miranda. See
Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at *17-18, citing Harris v. South Carolina,
338 U.S. 68 (1949) (referring to this factor, the Court suggested the factor insignifi-
cant in the voluntariness inquiry); see also Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae,
supra note 81, at *33 (arguing that, even "under current law, no such inquiry is rele-
vant in order to assess the voluntariness of a suspect's confession; that the Harris case
was merely a plurality opinion; and that the government could not come up with one
majority opinion); Thomas, supra note 24, at 17 (suggesting that because knowledge
is not required for waiver under Colorado v. Spring, "Section 3501 actually gives de-
fendants more than Miranda has been held to require); Kamisar, supra note 79, at 934
and note 262. Careful research, however, does reveal that courts did consider it as a
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analysis. The last factor is whether counsel was present during
the interrogation, and that factor was also considered by the
Court prior to 19 6 6 .12 As Kamisar has correctly stated, section
3501 "adds nothing to the pre-Miranda voluntariness test. '126 As
a result, we can use as an empirical proxy for section 3501 the
voluntariness regime that pre-dated Miranda and that still exists
today.
From this perspective, the best evidence of the potential ef-
fect of Miranda warnings on law enforcement is the thorough
exchange between Paul Cassell and Steve Schulhofer in the
Northwestern University Law Review on the set of empirical
studies concerning the impact of Miranda around the time of its
passage-what are known as the Miranda impact studies.27 In
Miranda's Social Cost: An Empirical Reassessment, Paul Cassell
compiles, reviews and assesses eleven "before-and-after" studies
that were conducted around the time of the Miranda decision. 28
These studies were originally designed to assess the change in
the confession rate in various jurisdictions. The distinct advan-
tage of these studies, as Cassell notes, is that "studies in a single
jurisdiction automatically hold constant a variety of factors that
might otherwise confound comparative analysis."' 29  Cassell
credits eight of the ten studies that found a decline in confes-
sions after Miranda, and excludes the one study from Los Ange-
factor in the totality of the circumstances analysis before Miranda. In Turner v. Penn-
sylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 63 (1949), for instance, the Supreme Court considered as a fac-
tor in its Due Process analysis the fact that the police "did not tell the petitioner why
he was being arrested." See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kemp v. Pate, 240 F. Supp. 696,
705-706 (N.D. 111. 1965) (due process violated where, inter alia, defendant was not in-
formed of the charge against him during interrogation).
'2 In Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962), a case involving a 14-year-old
boy, the Court noted that "the failure to see to it that he had the advice of a lawyer or
a friend" was a factor that made his confession involuntary and in violation of the Due
Process clause. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957) (defendant was
denied Due Process where his confession was obtained after lengthy questioning in
the absence of counsel); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207-208 (1960) (confes-
sion obtained, inter alia, in the absence of counsel, violated due process); Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 240 (1941) (depriving suspect of advice of counsel is rele-
vant when determining whether confession is voluntarily obtained); see also cases cited
in Brief for the United States, supra note 81, at *15, n.10.
'1 Kamisar, supra note 79, at 930; see id, at 930-936 (reviewing the law of pre-
Miranda voluntariness in light of section 3501's list of factors to consider).
17 See Cassell, supra note 101; Schulhofer, supra note 82.
18 See Cassell, supra note 101, at 395-416.
"9' Id. at 395.
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les that found an increase in confessions after Miranda.'"0 Cas-
sell factors the eight studies together and concludes that there
was about a 16.1% decline in confessions as a result of
Miranda.13
Stephen Schulhofer reexamines the same studies, and
reaches a slightly different conclusion about the average decline
in confessions in the wake of the Court's Miranda decision.1
2
Reassessing the evidence, Schulhofer concludes that it supports,
at most, a claim that Miranda resulted in between 6.4% and
9.7% reduction in confessions in the immediate post-Miranda
period, depending on whether to include the Los Angeles study
(which involved a regime with some warnings prior to Miranda).
The differences between Cassell and Schulhofer are summa-
rized in the following table:
TABLE 1: "BEFORE-AND-AFTER" STUDIES ON CONFESSION RATES
STUDY CASSEL SCHULHOFER
Pittsburgh, PA -18.6% -16.2%
New York County -34.5% Exclude as unreliable
Philadelphia, PA -24.6% -13.8% (perhaps un-
derestimating)
Seaside City, CA -2.0% 0% (perhaps underes-
timating)
New Haven, CT -16.0% -12.3%
Washington, DC Exclude as unreliable Exdude as unreliable
New Orleans, LA -11.8% Exclude as unreliable
Kansas City, KA -6.0% -6.0%
Kings County, NY -15.5% Exclude as unreliable
Chicago, IL Exclude as unreliable Exclude as unreliable
Los Angeles, CA Exclude as unreliable +9.8% (but some warn-
ings given)
AVERAGE -16.1% -9.7% (excluding LA)
or -6.4% (including
LA)
IS See id, at 417.
13, See id.
11 SeeSchulhofer, supra note 82, at 516-39; see also Leo, supra note 97, at 632-52 (re-
viewing and assessing most of these before-and-after studies); George C. Thomas III,
Is Miranda a Real-World Failure? A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA
L. REv. 821, 826-31 (1996) (reviewing and assessing several of the studies).
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On the basis of two other adjustments-the greater effect of
Miranda in larger cities, and the evidence of a pre-Miranda de-
clining trend in confessions-Schulhofer suggests that the re-
duction in confessions may in fact have been between 5.8% and
a low of 4.1%.133
What the Cassell-Schulhofer exchange suggests is that the
implementation of the Miranda procedure in 1966 against the
backdrop of the Due Process procedure may have resulted in an
average reduction in confessions of between a high of 16.1%
(Cassell's findings) and a low of 4.1% (Schulhofer's lowest find-
ing) .13 Although many factors may account for changing rates
of confessions, given the time frame of the studies, it is likely
that a substantial portion of this change in 1966-67 was due to
the requirement of Miranda warnings.
Based on his review of the before-and-after studies and an
estimate that confessions are needed in 24% of confession cases,
Paul Cassell argues that the Miranda warnings resulted in lost
cases on average against 3.8% of criminal suspects in the period
immediately following Miranda."' If that rate were applied to
'3 See Schulhofer, supra note 82, at 539-41, 545. Richard Leo also reviewed and as-
sessed these early Miranda impact studies, and he concluded inter alia that suspects
continued to provide detectives with confessions and incriminating statements [in the
years 1966-69], though in some instances at a lower rate than prior to Miranda." Leo,
supra note 97, at 645.
"' Cassell also conducted his own more contemporary study of police interroga-
tion practices in Salt Lake County, Utah, but that study seems inconclusive in this
context because it does not have a proper before comparison. From his study, Cassell
found that 42.2% of interrogated suspects gave incriminating statements; however,
Cassell did not have a reliable figure for pre-Miranda confession rates for that juris-
diction. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 98, at 871-72. George Thomas reexamined
Cassell's data and put the number at 54%. See George C. Thomas III, Plain Talk About
the Miranda Empirical Debate: A 'kteady-State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REv. 933,
935-36, 946-53 (1996). Thomas argued that Cassell had improperly excluded from
his collection of incriminating statements, first, confessions that he considered to be
volunteered, and second statements that were useful to the police (of the type "denial
with explanation"). Cassell estimated a pre-Miranda confession rate of 55-60% and
elsewhere has reported pre-Miranda confession rates ranging from 21.5% to 68.9%,
so the Salt Lake County study may reflect, at most, a mid- to low-range confession rate
with no reliable comparative measure of earlier confession rates. See Cassell, supra
note 101, at 418 tbl.1.
"3 See Cassell, supra note 101, at 438.
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current crime figures, Cassell argues, it would translate into the
loss of about 28,000 arrests for serious crimes of violence, 79,000
arrests for property crimes, and almost the same number of
cases being disposed of on terms more favorable for defen-
dants " 6
Schulhofer's assessment, naturally, is lower. As indicated
earlier, his estimate of lost confessions, based on the before-and-
after studies, including all adjustments, is between a high of
5.8% and a low of 4.1%.13 His estimate of the necessity rate for
confessions is 19%, rather than 24%.138 That results in an esti-
mated average loss of convictions between 1.1% and 0.78% in
the immediate post-Miranda period. 9 Accordingly, using the
Miranda impact studies, the Miranda warnings resulted in a loss
of cases against criminal suspects of between a high of 3.8% and
a low of 0.78% in the immediate aftermath of Miranda.1
40
See id. at 484.
,' See Schulhofer, supra note 82 at 545.
'8 See id.
139 See id.
,40 Paul Cassell has also tried to quantify the effect of Miranda on law enforcement
by studying crime clearance rates. First, Gassell studied the trend in clearance rates
for the four-year period following Miranda. He found that, whereas clearance rates
were relatively steady around 60% from 1950 to 1965, the rate of clearance dropped
consistently during the four years after Miranda, and then plateaued at about 45% af-
ter that. Cassell argues that Miranda accounts for that change. Paul G. Cassell, All
Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084
(1996). Stephen Schulhofer, however, has demonstrated that the drop closely tracks
the decline in the capacity of law enforcement to clear crimes. When the data is ad-
justed to reflect that decline, the data actually show that the number of crimes
cleared per officer rose steadily during the period. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda and
Clearance Rates, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 278, 283-84, 286-87 (1996). Cassell subsequently re-
visited his clearance rate study, and, with a colleague, Richard Fowles, used regression
analysis on the data. Cassell and Fowles found that, holding other variables constant,
the Miranda warnings-or more appropriately, the year 1966-correlated with re-
duced clearance rates for property crimes, robbery and total violent crimes, but not
for murder, rape or assault. According to Cassell and Fowles, the Miranda warnings
caused a 6.7% drop in the clearance rate for total violent crimes, and a 2.3% drop in
the clearance rate for total property crimes. Paul G. Gassell & Richard Fowles, Hand-
cuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforce-
ment, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1055, 1086-88 (1998). John Donohue at Stanford University
has replicated and reexamined, with slightly different statistical methods, the data.
Donohue concluded that, although there was a statistically significant effect with re-
gard to larceny and total violent crimes, there was none for other property crimes or
for the individual crimes that make up the category of total violent crimes (murder,
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To be sure, these rates may not apply thirty-five years later.
There have been significant changes. The Miranda warnings
have become part of our cultural understanding and are cer-
tainly more well known by the average person today than they
were thirty-five years ago. Police interrogators also have learned
how to give Miranda warnings without alarming suspects. Leo
and White argue, in fact, that because of new police techniques
that minimize the Miranda warnings, assessments that seek to
quantify the costs of Miranda in terms of lost confessions or lost
cases should be dismissed as insignificant.14 ' Both of these
changes-increased general awareness and modified police
practices-would suggest that the Miranda warnings may have a
smaller effect on law enforcement today than the Miranda im-
pact studies suggest. But, these studies do give us an idea of the
potential impact of the Miranda warnings on law enforcement
behavior.
There is other evidence that addresses the issue of law en-
forcement efficiency. For example, there is some evidence that
law enforcement officers believe the Miranda warnings have not
impeded law enforcement.' 42 In the wake of former Attorney
General Ed Meese's call in 1986 to overrule Miranda, the
American Bar Association conducted hearings in three cities
and a randomized telephone survey. The ABA Report con-
cluded that "[a] very strong majority of those surveyed prosecu-
tors, judges, and police officers agree that compliance with
Miranda does not present serious problems for law enforce-
ment.,1
robbery, rape, and assault). Donohue also challenged Cassell for failing to control
for unquantifiable variables, including, for instance, legal changes unrelated to
Miranda and changes in police reporting of crime. John J. Donohue, III, Did Miranda
Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1147 (1998); see, also, Weisselberg, supra
note 35, at 175-76; Leo & White, supra note 75, at 400 n.11. Because Cassell's clear-
ance studies do not account for the other significant changes in constitutional crimi-
nal procedure that occurred in the mid-1960s, we do not believe that the research is
reliable on the question of Miranda's effect on law enforcement.
141 See LEO & WrTE, supra note 75, at 471.
,42 See generally, Schulhofer, supra note 82, at 504; Schulhofer, supra note 35, at 456-
57; Leo & White, supra note 75, at 402; Weisselberg, supra note 35, at 165 n.285.




An earlier survey conducted in 1972 in southern Illinois and
western Massachusetts of sixty-seven law enforcement supervi-
sors, including police chiefs, sheriffs, police barracks' com-
manders and a troop commander, revealed similar results.
Overall, "the officers were extremely favorable toward ... the
Miranda warnings.... 4  All but a couple of the Illinois chiefs
and sheriffs reacted positively. In Massachusetts, the over-
whelming number was favorable.
On the other hand, Cassell and others argue that law en-
forcement officers generally view the Miranda warnings as sig-
nificantly hampering law enforcement.14 6 Cassell points to the
numerous amicus briefs filed by law enforcement organizations
in support of the Fourth Circuit decision in Dickerson, as well as
in the earlier case of Withrow.14 7 Of course, amicus briefs are of-
ten solicited by the parties to the litigation. With the exception
of an unpublished and somewhat ambiguous 1987 telephone
survey, though, most of the studies that Cassell refers to date
from the 1966-70 period.
48
It has also been argued that Miranda enhances efficient law
enforcement because it requires police officers to rely more on
crime scene evidence and testimonial evidence, rather than
confessions. In the ABA survey, for example, several judge re-
spondents indicated that the Miranda decision had helped to
professionalize and educate the police.' Richard Leo con-
cluded from his study of 182 interrogations that the Miranda
warnings have "increased the level of professionalism among
police officers and detectives."'50
Where does this evidence leave us? We think that a fair as-
sessment of the empirical evidence suggests that the require-
ment that Miranda warnings be given resulted in some loss of
cases against suspects, however slight, in the immediate after-
"' STEPHEN L. WASBY, SMALL TOWN POLICE AND THE SUPREME COURT: HEARING THE
WORD 89 (1976).
... See id. at 89-90.
"6 See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae, supra note 81, at *24-25; see also Cassell,
supra note 176, at 1106-1110.
11
7 See Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae, supra note 81, at *24-25.
,4' See Cassell, supra note 140, at 1107-1108.
,4 SeeABA, supra note 143, at 30-31.
150 Leo, supra note 97, at 668-71.
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math of Miranda. Had the methodologies of the studies been
entirely flawed, as some suggest, then Stephen Schulhofer
would have excluded those studies from his re-analysis. The
number is probably small, in the low single digits, less than
3.8%. But there was probably some effect, however slight, on
law enforcement. In this respect, we agree with Leo's early as-
sessment of the Miranda impact literature: "suspects continued
to provide detectives with confessions and incriminating state-
ments (in the years 1966-69), though in some instances at a
lower rate than prior to Miranda."'15' We also agree with Leo and
others that the passage of time has probably further eroded the
impact. So the differential might be extremely small today. And
there may be some cases where the Miranda procedures have ac-
tually helped obtain confessions that would not otherwise have
been obtained.
In sum, relevant research suggests that the Miranda warn-
ings-and their dissemination in popular culture-have re-
sulted in increased public awareness of the right to remain
silent and have been effective in notifying accused persons of
that right. The overall effectiveness of Miranda at protecting ac-
cused persons from compelled incrimination has been some-
what undermined by recent developments in interrogation
techniques. The Miranda warnings probably have some nega-
tive impact on law enforcement and result possibly in the loss of
cases against suspects in a range between a small fraction of one
percent and two or three percent of cases. From a normative
perspective, we would contend, in light of the relevant research,
that the balance of liberty and order favors the continued use of
Miranda warnings.
What is more important than our own assessment of the
evidence and normative balancing, though, is the fact that all of
these studies-the Leo studies, the Cassell-Schulhofer debate,
and all the other debates that they have spawned-are pub-
lished material. The studies go over the points of disagreement
in minute detail. Any court interested in forming its own opin-
ion on the matter need only read the articles and assess the ar-
guments about the validity of the different studies. The articles
explain why certain studies are reliable and others not. For ex-
"' LEo, supra note 97, at 645 (Leo is, however, skeptical that these studies reveal
anything due to their methodological flaws); see id at 647-48.
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ample, one of the points of disagreement in the Cassell-
Schulhofer debate is whether to include the New Orleans study.
Schulhofer argues that the New Orleans study should be ex-
cluded because the before portion of the before-and-after study
was based on a rough ballpark estimate by the police depart-
ment that self-incriminating statements were made in about
40% of the arrests.52 Anyone reading the exchange should be
able to make his or her own informed decision as to whether to
include the study or not.
Again, our purpose here is not to resolve the question for
the Court. It is instead to point the Court to empirical evidence
from which it could have decided Dickerson, and suggest that the
case should have turned on an evaluation of the social scientific
evidence. It is to highlight the relevance of the empirical evi-
dence and suggest that the Court's decision would have been
better reasoned-and more transparent, more open to criti-
cism-if the Court had addressed the research. In other words,
the Court, we suggest, should have taken a position on whether
a 3.8% (or lower) loss of cases does or does not call for reevalu-
ating the Miranda procedures. By specifically addressing those
kind of empirical issues, the Court would be making its norma-
tive decisions far more transparent. In this sense, we agree with
Leo and White. "In order to determine whether Miranda's
warnings and waiver requirement provide an adequate constitu-
tional safeguard, society needs to decide the extent to which law
enforcement officers interrogating criminal suspects should be
restrained, and the extent to which individuals subjected to
such interrogation should be protected.',
153
B. ILINOIS V. WARDLOW
While there were no Fourth Amendment cases on the
Court's docket this term that received the kind of attention
showered (deservedly) on Dickerson, there were cases, such as Il-
linois v. Wardlow'54 and JL. v. Florida,'55 that illustrate well the
112 See Schulhofer, supra note 35.
"5' Leo & White, supra note 75, at 464.
154 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000).
"' 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000).
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need for increased attention to social science research. Here,
we will focus on Illinois v. Wardlow, where the Court was asked to
determine whether a police officer's stop of a suspect, after he
fled upon seeing several police cruisers patrolling an area
known for heavy narcotics trafficking, violated the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution. The Court, in a 5-to-4 deci-
sion, decided that the stop was constitutional, and reversed the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision to the contrary.
What was unique about this particular case was that both
the petitioner and the respondent asked the Court to adopt
bright-line rules in order to determine the scope of Fourth
Amendment rights in the context presented to the Court. The
State of Illinois asked the Court to create a bright-line rule that
fleeing from police officers always raises reasonable suspicion
that crime is afoot. Wardlow asked the Court to decide that
flight from police officers alone could never reasonably raise
these suspicions.
The Supreme Court declined to adopt either side's prof-
fered presumption; instead, the Court cleaved to its well-worn
totality-of-the-circumstances test. Through an application of
that test, the Court decided that flight from an identified police
officer in an area known for heavy narcotics sales constituted
reasonable suspicion. Whether or not the Court's conclusion is
correct is clearly open to debate. The Court itself split 5-to-4
over the issues presented in Wardlow. We would like to focus
here on how the Court reached this conclusion. In the process
we hope to demonstrate how the Court's greater use of relevant
social science in the course of articulating the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection would have made the Court's decision
better and more transparent.
The Wardlow case required the Court to apply the analysis it
had first articulated in Terry v. Ohio,'56 another paradigmatic ex-
ample of the Court's use of a balancing-of-interests jurispruden-
tial approach. In Tery, the Court interpreted the Fourth
Amendment by balancing individual interests in liberty (privacy,
1'6 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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property, and autonomy)5 7 against societal interests in safety
(which include, of course, the stopped-and-searched person's
interests). The Court departed from its then long-time insis-
tence that police interventions, searches, and seizures, be justi-
fied by the level of particularized suspicion known as probable
cause.'5 8 The Court instead determined, focusing on the Rea-
sonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment, that a rather
common police practice of the time,15 9 a protective pat-down of
a stopped person's clothing that fell short of a full-blown search,
need only be justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot and that the person with whom the
officer is dealing may be armed and dangerous.' 6 In so doing
the Court avoided siding with either the suspect, Terry, who ar-
gued that all searches, even the somewhat limited pat-down pre-
sented in the case, must be justified by probable cause, or the
State of Ohio, which argued that because the pat-down was not
a search at all the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by the
frisk.
The Court's decision in Terry reflects a conception of pro-
portionality. 6 1 Since a pat-down is less intrusive than a full-
blown search and since an investigatory stop is less intrusive
than a full-blown arrest, then one might conclude that these
lesser intrusions may be justified by less evidence than more se-
rious intrusions. This reasoning, of course, is not a foregone
conclusion.6  Although the Terry Court departed from the
117 See Christopher Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for the Rejuvenation of the
Proportionality Principle, 72 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 1053, 1057 (1998).
"8 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
" SeeWayne R. LaFave, Detentionfor Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current
Practices, 1962 WASH. U. L. Q. 331, 335-36 (explaining the stop and frisk procedure
observed during a 1956-57 study of the actual practices of police, which was spon-
sored by the American Bar Foundation).
,60 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Justice Warren's majority opinion said very little about
stops that accompany or are antecedent to frisks, but Justice Harlan in concurrence
emphasized that the frisk in the case depended upon the reasonableness of the ac-
companying stop, and that the right to frisk must be automatic "if the reason for the
stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence." Id. at 33.
' See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 157, at 1053; see also Christopher Slobogin, The
World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1991).
'6 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 36 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that that frisks should
be justified by probable cause).
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more stringent probable cause requirement to justify a "stop
and frisk," the Court forthrightly acknowledged that a pat-down
search of a citizen's body
is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be under-
taken lightly.... Even a limited search of the outer clothing for weap-
ons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished
personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening and
perhaps humiliating experience.
Yet, the Court declined to find that this demanded a more
stringent justificatory standard.
The Court's conclusion is consistent with balancing of in-
terests. If we assume that people generally prefer to be more
rather than less safe, and if we also assume that people prefer
less rather than more State intrusion into their personal liberty,
then the achievement of the highest level of safety through the
least intrusive means is ideal. Requiring police to justify less in-
trusive police actions (such as stops) with the same level of evi-
dence as more intrusive police actions (such as arrests) provides
law enforcers with little incentive to prefer the former over the
latter.
But, the ideal seems to express a societal preference for less
intrusive police actions-especially if a less intrusive action can
achieve the same or higher level of safety as an action more in-
trusive of an individual's rights. Allowing police to justify stops
and frisks with less evidence than is required for arrests and full
searches implicitly encourages police officers to prefer these
lesser intrusive actions over more serious ones. One difficulty,
though, is that we might expect that a lesser justificatory stan-
dard for lesser intrusions would encourage a greater number of
these less intrusive actions compared to the number of more in-
trusive actions, such as arrests, that the police would otherwise
engage in when held to the higher justificatory standard for
these more intrusive actions. Is this state of affairs consistent
with the ideal of producing the highest level of safety possible
with the least amount of intrusion? That depends on how one
3 Id. at 17, 24-25.
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thinks about the trade off between a higher number of less in-
trusive actions and a lower number of more intrusive ones in re-
lation to the societal goal of promoting a certain level of safety.
The Court, through Terry and its progeny, seems to have en-
dorsed the view that more, broad, prophylactic law enforcement
strategies may well be preferable to fewer, deeper, reactive
ones.16
Thus, Teny's reasonableness approach ultimately depends
on social policy analysis, including consideration of law en-
forcement needs, police and public safety, and social realities
such as race relations between the police and the policed in dis-
advantaged neighborhoods. We believe, as we stated earlier,
that the focus on policy is the strength of the balancing test.
However, it is clear that such a focus can be a weakness - par-
ticularly ifjudges are not well informed about the social and po-
litical realities on which the contours of these rights depend.
When they are not suitably informed, the reasonableness analy-
sis allows judges simply to promote their own ideological
agenda without that agenda being readily exposed. We do not
believe, as some critics of the reasonableness approach do, that
the approach more easily allows judicial decision makers to im-
pose their own ideological views on a case. But, the reasonable-
ness approach may make it easier for decision makers to hide
their decision-making process through hand waving. It is this
aspect of balancing, not the analysis itself, that ought to be
avoided. We believe that it can be limited, if not avoided,
through a greater emphasis on social science. Informed prag-
matism, rather than increased formalism, is our prescription.
With this background established, we return to an analysis of
Wardlow.
'a' Former police officer James Fyfe, in a recent symposium on Terry v. Ohio, re-
counts the practices of the elite Los Angeles Police Department's Special Investiga-
tion Section (SIS). He explains that SIS refrains from intervening in situations that
are merely suspicious. Instead, SIS surveils people planning crime and observes them
while they commit crimes. This practice results in the deaths of suspects "about one
for every 25 arrested" and the presentation of very strong cases against those who sur-
vive. It also violates the police obligation to protect life; police stand by as terrorized
victims are robbed and brutalized. SeeJamesJ. Fyfe, Terry An Ex-] Cop's View, 72 ST.
JoHN'sL. REv. 1231, 1242 (1998).
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If an individual flees after seeing several identified police of-
ficers in a high crime areas, does such conduct lead a police of-
ficer to be reasonably suspicious that crime is afoot? Courts
commonly consider the assertion that the police observed the
suspect in a high-crime area before making a stop in determin-
ing whether a stop is justified-an indication that police officers
may reasonably rely on such information in determining
whether to stop a suspect. 10 But, the Supreme Court has clearly
said that presence in a high-crime area alone is not sufficient to
justify a stop of a suspect.r In Wardlow, the additional factor
motivating the police to act was the fact that the suspect ran.
Thus, at the heart of Wardlow is the degree of suspicion that at-
taches to a person's flight. Specifically, the case turns on how
reliably flight indicates guilt.
If we knew that crime was indeed afoot in the vast majority
of cases in which police stopped individuals on the street after
such individuals had run away from them, then we would likely
be much less concerned about the intrusion on individual lib-
erty that takes place during the stop. We would conclude that
this category of information is a good reason ex ante for police
action, not only because the category of information seems to
reliably indicate guilt of crime, but also because the particular
criterion satisfied by the category of information-how reliably
the information indicates that crime is afoot-is a legitimate ex-
planation for police action. 7
'65 See Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676 ("[W]e have previously noted the fact that the
stop occurred in a 'high crime area' [is] among the relevant contextual considera-
tions in a Terry analysis") (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, (1972)); see
also Ex parte Tucker, 667 So.2d 1339 (Ala. 1995); Commonwealth v. Cheek, 597
N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1992); WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 189 (3d ed. 1996) (location "is itself a highly relevant con-
sideration).
66 See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) ("The fact that appellant was in a neigh-
borhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that
appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct.")
,6" Note, however, that this analysis focuses on what are good reasons for police ac-
tion. We might also think that police action is justified simply when the reasons for
action are not bad ones. So randomized stops of individuals at sobriety checkpoints
may be acceptable not so much because police have a good reason for stopping any
780
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The difficulty, though, is that the Supreme Court has never
used exact proportions to explain the level of certainty a police
officer must possess under the reasonableness approach. 168 De-
spite the Court's relunctance to discuss the level of certainty
probabilistically, there is evidence that decision-makers assess
the level of evidence that justifies different police actions in im-
plicit probabilistic terms. For example, in one study, 96 out of
166 federal judges surveyed indicated a belief that the reason-
able suspicion standard requires 40% certainty or less that evi-
dence of crime would be found by an officer after a stop. 169 In
the same study, 25% of the judges indicated that 50% certainty
was necessary for reasonable suspicion, while another 19% indi-
cated that 60% certainty or more was necessary.' ° This empiri-
cal evidence makes it quite clear that Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence leaves open just how much liberty should be cir-
cumscribed.
To put this another way, the ultimate question in Wardlow
was: how good an indicator of guilt does flight from police have
to be? The answer to this question clearly can be informed by
social science research. Indeed, the Wardlow Court all but
begged for this information. During oral arguments in the case,
one Justice asked the Cook County State's Attorney whether
there was any empirical evidence that supported the inference
particular person, but, rather, because we are confident that there is no bad reason
for stopping the particular car.
'" In Wardlow, the Court said a police officer can be less certain that crime is afoot
than she would have to be were she effecting an arrest. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 677.
Rather than emphasizing a particular quantum of evidence necessary to justify a stop
under the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court has emphasized the factual basis
for the stop by requiring an officer to review all those factors that motivated him to
stop the suspect. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981) where the Court
stated:
it is also appropriate to consider the nature of the articuable and individualized suspicion
on which the police base the detention of the occupant of a home subject to a search war-
rant. ... The connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily
identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justified a
detention of that occupant.
'
69 See C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof. Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or Con-
stitutional Guarantees? 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1327 tbl. 3 (1982).
170 See id
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that individuals who flee from the police have something to
hide.' In response, the State's Attorney pointed to wisdom
from centuries-old common-law legal scholars claiming that it
was "natural" for "criminals to flee. ' 72 Another Justice asked
about available evidence concerning racial differences in rea-
sons for flight from the police, apparently reasoning that a
bright line requiring the inference of suspicion in cases of flight
would be inappropriate if it could be shown that different
groups of people systematically responded differently to the
presence of police in ways that called into question the correla-
tion between flight and guilt.1 73 In response to this very central
171 See Illinois v. Wardlow, No. 98-1036, 1999 WL 1034479, at *11-13 (U.S. Nov. 2,
1999) (oral argument):
QUESTION: Mr. Devine, there's been a lot of talk about my experience, your experience.
Is there any evidence, apart from intuition, that people who have something to hide run?
Justice Souter asked the question about how many innocent people are in jeopardy. Is
there any empirical evidence at all to back up this intuition that people don't run unless
they have something to hide?
MR. DEVINE: Well, Your Honor, we have the entire history of this country with the com-
mentators and the cases that have-
QUESTION: You have this case for starters. Right?
MR. DEVINE: Well, absolutely, Your Honor. You have after the stop, a weapon with five
live rounds in it was found on Mr. Wardlow.
QUESTION: Well, we have this case, but how many on the other side where this practice is
followed? How many innocent people get stopped because they sped away?
MR. DEVINE: Well, again, Your Honor, based on my-my view of it as a prosecutor for a
number of years, I don't believe it occurs that often. But what we are talking about-
QUESTION: But we don't have any empirical studies of this, do we?
MR. DEVINE: We don't have any to submit, Your Honor. We have the history of this coun-
try, how flight has been looked at over the course of the history of this country.
QUESTION: And that-that's-some of those cases, at least, involve flight after an accusation,
after a charge.
17 See id. at *5.
'7' See id. at *13:
QUESTION: What do you-what do you say about the argument that-well, there are some
neighborhoods, high crime neighborhoods in particular, where people are afraid of the
police? Maybe the police just stop people randomly and search them, and there can be a
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question, the State's attorney responded, effectively, that such
information is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment question
presented in the case. 74 These very good questions were not the
only indications of the Court's sensitivity to the relevance of so-
cial science to the task of constitutional interpretation in Ward-
low.
Justice Souter, however, posed what we think to be the most
central question in this case when he asked, "[H] ow many inno-
cents are going to be stopped in relation to the whole? That
seems to me the tough question."' 75 In posing the question in
this way, Justice Souter laid bare the intertwined nature of the
Fourth Amendment's balancing test and empirical evidence.
However, in response to this question the State's Attorney again
referred to ancient legal scholars rather than empirical evi-
dence about the impact of the police practice in question. 176 In
our view, Wardlow and cases like it cannot be adequately decided
without attention to this question and the previous questions
posed by other justices of the Court.
The paucity of social science research presented to the
Court provided the majority with a rationale for not adopting
racial element involved, a white policeman in a black neighborhood. Say, that in that
neighborhood, people are frightened of the police and they run away. They just don't
want to get involved...
See id. at *14'15 (Mr. Devine speaking):
My response is that-that since Teny, when the Court discussed that issue, this Court has
said that under the Fourth Amendment we apply a colorblind test. We look at the balanc-
ing outside of those issues, and if those issues are there, application of sanctions under the
Fourth Amendment isn't going to resolve them. They should be handled, as this Court has
said, as recently as Wren, either by equal protection claims or section 1983 claims or ad-
ministrative charges within the particular police department.
I would submit, Your Honor, that if we start to classify when we can do a Fourth
Amendment stop, based on Teny, or arrest based on probable cause, considering what the
race of the police officer is, the race of the individual that is involved, the Fourth Amend-
ment will be unworkable and will prevent the police officers from doing the job that we
want them to do. That's why we believe a bright line rule is appropriate here.
175 id.
'76 "Well, Your Honor, I would again note that flight, going back to the time of the
Framers has been considered suspicious behavior.. . ." Illinois v. Wardlow, No. 98-
1036, 1999 WL 1034479 at *9 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1999) (oral argument).
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either of the bright line rules urged by the parties-both of
whom, understandably, sought to gain greater clarity regarding
the contours of the Fourth Amendment protections. Lower
courts had addressed the relationship between flight from a po-
lice officer and reasonable suspicion, as well as flight from a po-
lice officer in a high crime area, both in favor of reasonable
suspicion findings and against them.77 But because neither side
presented empirical research studies dealing with the relation-
ship between flight and guilt, the Court claimed that it had to
rely on "commonsense judgements and inferences about hu-
man behavior.',178 After making that elliptical statement, the ma-
jority concluded that the police officer who stopped Wardlow
had indeed acted in a manner that comported with the Consti-
tution.
In a world in which there really is no research available to
inform the Court's commonsense judgments about human be-
havior, perhaps this conclusion would not be troubling. If rele-
vant research is indeed lacking, then personal experience (to
which much reference was made in oral arguments), and cita-
tions to Proverbs179 may be better than guessing. At least we
could be confident that the Court was doing the best it could to
make a difficult decision without social authority to help guide
it. But what if there is social science research available to in-
form the Court's commonsense judgments? Does it still make
sense to be confident about the Court's ability to make difficult
decisions concerning the requisite balance between liberty and
order without consulting it? Do we really believe that the un-
adorned commonsense judgments of the justices of the Su-
preme Court are adequate to determine the scope of individual
rights?
Justice Stevens' dissent provides a welcome break from the
opaque reasoning behind the majority's common sense judg-
ments in Wardlow. To call into question Illinois' assumption that
'7 See David Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court
Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 975, 990-
996 (1998) (collecting cases).
178 Wardlow, 120 S Ct. at 676, citingU.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
'79 "The wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are bold as a lion."
Proverbs 28:1 (KingJames).
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flight from a police officer is always aberrant or abnormal, Jus-
tice Stevens cited social authority indicating that 43% of Afri-
can-Americans consulted in one poll consider "police brutality
and harassment a serious problem in their own community;"'80
that minorities experience street stops at numbers dispropor-
tionate to their representation in the population of many cit-
ies; 's that African-Americans are more than twice as likely to be
dissatisfied with police practices than white residents in twelve
cities surveyed;'82 and that police departments in some major
urban areas recognize that racial bias on the part of the officers
employed hampers the effectiveness of the force. By pointing
to this research, Justice Stevens sought to demonstrate that
flight from a police officer-especially by a member of a minor-
ity group-is not necessarily the product of guilt, but may be
triggered by fear or dislike of police officers by an innocent per-
son.
The five Justices in the majority apparently agreed with the
four dissenters on this particular point, as the Court unani-
mously rejected the Petitioner's call for a bright-line rule re-
garding flight. While the majority did not cite the authority
proffered by the dissenters, the majority did reference the ar-
guments of Respondent and amici--arguments relying on this
authority and incorporated in the dissent-and did suggest that
flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity.
But that point, said the majority, "does not establish a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.',
184
Justice Stevens' evidence, however, did not really address
the most central legal and empirical question in Wardlow.
namely, whether the risk that an innocent person may be
stopped when police officers rely on flight in an area known for
,"0 Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 673 n. 7 (citingJohnson, American's views on Crime and Law
Enforcement: Survey Findings, National Institute ofJustice Journal 13 (Sept. 1997)).
"' See id. (citing Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund as Amicus Cu-
riae at 17-19).
812 See id. (citing U.S. Dept. of'Justice, Bureau ofJustice Statistics, S. Smith, Criminal
Victimization and Perceptions of Community Safety in 12 Cities, 25 (June 1998)).
"' See id. at 673 n. 9 (citing Report of the Independent Commission on the Los
Angeles Police Department 69 (1991)).
.84 Id at 677.
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narcotics trafficking is too high to be constitutionally accept-
able. Neither the majority nor the dissent looked to empirical
evidence on this central question in Wardlow. Instead, as noted,
the majority chose to answer the question with reference to
commonsense judgments. This is precisely the kind of reason-
ing that critics of balancing abhor; however, this kind of deci-
sion-making is not inevitable. It can be improved with greater
reliance on social authority.
A pathbreaking study of street stops in New York City re-
leased on December 1, 1999, about six weeks before Wardlow
was published, provides critical insight to the central question in
Wardlow.1'5 While a study of Chicago street stops would have
been more apt, this study of police activity in a major urban area
contains information directly pertinent to the central legal and
empirical question in Wardlow and surely constitutes social
authority for the case.
The New York OAG study was completed in order to "move
the issue of police-community relations to a place where reality
drives perceptions rather than the reverse. 186 The study is an
analysis of 175,000 forms collected over one year that is com-
pared with census data, crime statistics and demographic infor-
mation to yield a statistically valid, quantitative view of the
practice of "stop and frisk.' 8, 7 While the executive summary of
the study indicates that perceptions of racial injustice in polic-
18 Although the report was not issued early enough for it to be included in the
briefs in the case, it was available to the Justices when they wrote the opinion. We ex-
plore the report here as an example of evidence that could be used in making a rea-
sonableness determination rather than condemning the court for overlooking the
report.
" Civil Rights Bureau, Off. of the Att'y Gen., The New York City Police Department's
"Stop & Frisk" Practice: A Report from the Office of the Attorney Genera iv (December 1,
1999) (hereinafter "OAG Report").
"7 The forms that provide the fodder for this analysis are known as "UF-250s." Ac-
cording to the NYPD's Patrol Guide, a police officer who stops and frisks an individ-
ual must complete a UF-250 if a person is (1) stopped by force; (2) stopped and
frisked; (3) arrested; (4) stopped and refuses to identify oneself. Id at 89. In police-
suspect encounters that fall outside these four contexts, a police officer may fill out a
form if he or she desires to do so, but does not necessarily have to do so. The pool of
forms analyzed in the study contained about three quarters mandated reports and
the rest voluntary. Id. at 91. The forms covered stops that occurred in 1998 and the
first three months in 1999. Id at v.
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ing spurred the initiation of the research,"' the study also pro-
vides a wealth of information beyond the racial impact of stops
in New York. Particularly notable for our purposes is data col-
lected in the study connecting the rate of stops made by police
and subsequent arrests.
The relationship between stops and arrests is a potential
method of determining how good an indicator a particular fac-
tor for police action must be. The relevance of this relationship
was noted by Justice Stevens in dissent. Justice Stevens pointed
in passing to a newspaper article reporting that in 1997, New
York City's Street Crimes Unit made 45,000 stops, only 20% of
which resulted in arrests.'8 Justice Stevens then wrote, "even if
these data were race neutral they would still indicate that society
as whole is paying a significant cost in infringement in liberty by
these virtually random stops."''1 This issue-namely, how sig-
nificant is the cost that society must pay to achieve a certain
level of safety-we submit, is precisely the question that must be
answered in Wardlow and in every case in which the Fourth
Amendment is in question. Justice Stevens' reference to em-
pirical evidence provides an excellent opportunity to have this
discussion-and to have this discussion in a much more trans-
parent fashion.
The New York OAG Report collects, in addition to racial
breakdowns on stops and frisks, a measure of how "good" those
stops are: how many of the stops lead to an arrest. Citywide,
that ratio was 9:1.19' That is, nine stops were made by the NYPD
for every eventual arrest.9 2 Here, then, is empirical confirma-
tion of the jurisprudential gap between the reasonable suspi-
cion and probable cause standards. Of course, this particular
gap may not be constitutionally justified, and we believe, as Jus-
tice Steven's assertion implies, that this kind of empirical infor-
mation should be reviewed by the Court to determine just how
close or wide this gap should be. What is clear is that a lower
' See id at iv.
8 See Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. at 681 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
"0 Id. at 680 n.8.
... See OAG Report, supra note 186.
"' See id. at 111.
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justificatory standard for police action should be expected to,
and does in fact result, in more police encounters with more
suspects-as the notion of proportionality that we discussed ear-
lier implies.
The citywide ratio masks a great deal. It masks variation in
ratios from as low as 6.3:1 for highway and traffic to 26.7:1 for
the narcotics task force. 93 It also masks racial differences in
stop-to-arrest ratios. After controlling for crime rates-meas-
ured in this study by arrest rates for various offenses-and pre-
cinct composition, researchers found that, whether the relevant
precinct was majority or minority Black, the comparison be-
tween the stop-to-arrest rates for Blacks and the same rates for
whites was almost always 2:1.'4
This analysis provides an even stronger case for the claim
made by the Wardlow amici that minority individuals have more
encounters with police that do not always trigger an initiation of
the criminal justice process than do whites. This information,
together with that cited by the dissenters, suggests that minority
individuals have a relationship with the police that makes inter-
pretation of flight extremely difficult.
These data are somewhat better at answering the central
question in Wardlow than the data cited by the dissent. Whereas
the latter simply amplified the noisy connection-at least for
certain minority groups-between flight from a police officer
and guilt, these data show very concretely that minority
groups-in the New York metropolitan area, at least-are sub-
jected to a greater amount of official intrusion than are those
from other groups, holding constant crime rates and racial
composition of the places in which the stops occur. Still, these
data do not say very much about the relevance of flight to rea-
sonable suspicion.
See id. at 112, tbl.l.B.1.
194 See id. tbl. 1C.1. So for example, the stop rate of Blacks in precincts that were
less than 10% Black was 52 stops of Blacks for every 100 Blacks arrested for violent
crime. That same rate for whites in the area was 24, yielding a ratio of 2.17 to 1. In
the more racially varied precincts that ratio was 2.14 to 1. And in the precincts with
the highest proportion of Black residents, the ratio was 2.11 to 1. There were simi-




Fortunately, the OAG Report contains still more informa-
tion. The report collects information on a sample of stops
95
based on facts that, as reported by the police, clearly meet the
constitutional standard of reasonable suspicion according to
Teny and its progeny.'9 Additionally, the report collects infor-
mation on stops based on facts that courts have decided clearly
do not constitute reasonable suspicion.9 7 Moreover, the report
collects information pertinent to the most important facts pres-
ent in Wardlow--suspects who flee from the police in high crime
areas. The table on the following page summarizes the OAG
Report.
Recall Justice Stevens' assertion that a ratio of five stops for
every one arrest is a "significant cost in infringement in liberty."
The data presented in this chart reveals that, in New York City,
at least, the criteria that the courts have traditionally relied
upon to support a finding of reasonable suspicion are very
close. They produce a ratio of 7.3 stops for every one arrest.
Here, then, is data that could help the Court to think very seri-
ously about whether the price citizens pay for a particular level
of safety is too high.
The chart also demonstrates quite clearly that whatever one
thinks about the price on liberty of stops generally determined
by courts to be constitutionally justified, the stops backed up by
reasons typically looked on with disfavor by the courts yield a
much higher stop-to-arrest ratio than the constitutionally-
justified stops-in fact, a ratio of 29.3:1.
Here, then, is evidence that allows for comparison of cate-
gories of evidence typically considered to meet (and not to
meet) constitutional standards. When cross-classified by race,
wrongful stops-those that did not articulate reasonable suspi-
cion-occurred at roughly the same rates for Blacks, Latinos,
and whites: 15.7%, 14.3% and 16.6% respectively. These are not
statistically significant differences. Interestingly, while it is clear
,95 For this portion of the analysis, a sample of 15,000 out of the database of
175,000 stops were used. See OAG Report, supra note 186, at 135.
" Categories of stop rationales were developed, and then the UF-250 forms were
coded in accordance with these categories. See OAG Report, supra note 186, at 135-
136. The researchers discussed with lawyers for the OAG the constitutional standard
to code, and a great deal data was excluded as providing insufficient data, as the
summary table below indicates.
"9 See id. at 135.
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that Blacks and Hispanics in New York are subject to greater
levels of intrusion, the data appear to say only that clearly
wrongful stops occur as often for whites as for people of color.
With respect to the particular issue presented in Wardlow,
the chart provides a fascinating picture of police work. Stops
reported as undertaken because the suspect fled the scene re-
sult in a very high stop-to-arrest ratio-a ratio of 26:1. This ratio
is quite close to that of stops based on factors generally under-
stood to fail to satisfy the reasonable suspicion test. Note that
even when flight in a high crime area is considered, the ratio
between stops and arrests lowers, but it does not lower by much.
It stands at 20.3:1. These data support the Wardlow dissenters'
argument that flight may be caused by a whole host of reasons
that are not indicative of criminal activity.
Importantly, however, the Wardlow Court did not discuss
merely the suspicious nature of flight generally; rather, the
Court assessed whether flight "upon noticing the police""08 or
"flight [that] was motivated by the presence of a police offi-
cer ' ' 9 was suspicious enough to justify a police stop. The re-
searchers who analyzed the data in the New York OAG Report
categorized this more specialized type of flight in a category
separate from the general flight category. The ratio between
stops and arrests with respect to flight to elude the police sug-
gest a tighter relationship than the general flight code. Indeed
the 15.8:1 ratio of stops to arrests for this category is quite close
to the ratio of the other categories of information for stops
deemed insufficient to determine constitutionality with confi-
dence-an indication that Wardlow is indeed the close case that
it appears on first impression to be. When the data on flight to
elude police are confined to high crime areas - the very context
presented by the facts in Wardlow - a different relationship be-
tween stops and arrests emerges. These data reveal a stop-to-
arrest ratio of 45:1.20
'9 Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. at 676.
' Id at 679 (StevensJ, dissenting).
2' Explanatory notes for categories used in analyzing the OAG report and in Table
2 below:
'The researchers considered these categories of information reported by an officer
as evidence meeting the reasonable suspicion justificatory standard: crime observed
(observed drug sale, jumping turnstile/metrocard fraud, theft of service, buy & bust,
graffiti); fit description (fit description, identified/information from third party at
790
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF THE OAG REPORT
TOTAL STOPS RESULTING IN RATIO OF STOPS
STOPS ARREST TO ARREST
Facts articulate rea-
sonable suspidon! 2,678 368 7.3
Facts do not articu-
late reasonable suspi- 673 23 29.3
cton
Insufficient informa-
tion 1,032 76 13.6
FLIGHT ALONEd
F7qeng cuime scene 104 4 26
Attempted flight 79 5 15.8
scene, bail jumping, known and wanted by police/active warrant); weapon observed
(waistband activity, bulge in waistband, observed object that could be (appeared to
be) gun weapon, laser light activity/toy guns); suspicious plus (eluding the police
plus other factors, location prone to robbery plus suspicious behavior (pacing, talking
to known dealers, loitering), carrying theft equipment/other paraphenalia, plac-
ing/retrieving object (drugs), location known for drug activity plus "suspicious behav-
ior" (pacing, standing around talking with passersby or known drug dealers), location
known for prostitution plus suspicious behavior, suspected break-in/burglary/on fire
escape, extended observation of suspicious activity (trying multiple car doors, ex-
tended observation activity, walking back and forth on same street, etc.).
bThe researchers considered these categories of information reported by an officer
as evidence not meeting the reasonable suspicion justificatory standard, rendering
the reported stop unconstitutional: Activity deemed suspicious (pocket/clothing ac-
tivity, bulge in clothing, attempting to elude police, suspicious behavior (nervousness,
pacing), suspicious clothing, association with a suspect/person arrested/known
dealer, gang affiliation (known member or clothing), loitering, known to police, loi-
tering on subway platform, looking in to parked cars/trying one door, black or silver
object/exchange of object; (wrong place), location known for drug activity, location
prone to robbery/burglary/grand larceny, location known for prostitution.
'The researchers considered these categories of information reported by an officer
as evidence insufficient to determine whether or not the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard was met: person in area that crime or suspicious activity was reported, fleeing
crime scene, suspected drug sale, observed drug use, suspected alcohol consump-
tion/open bottle, observed alcohol consumption/open bottle, moving furni-
ture/carrying out of place objects (computers), panhandling, insufficient
information, knife in pocket, questioned individual in an ongoing investigation.
'The data on flight were categorized in two ways: attempting to elude police, elud-
ing police plus other factors/suspicious activity, and fleeing the crime scene. The re-
searchers considered information relevant to the first category evidence of an
unconstitutional stop, and they considered evidence relevant to the second category
insufficient to make a determination. We are grateful to Jeffrey Fagan, Center for
Violence Research and Prevention, Columbia University for his analysis.
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FLIGHT IN IGH
CRIMARFA
aingainre see 61 3 20.3
Attempted flight 45 1 45
TOTAL 4,383 467 9.4
This astoundingly high relationship between stops and arrests is
suggestive that in high-crime urban communities where the
population is disproportionately minority, flight from an identi-
fiable police officer is a very poor indicator that crime is afoot.
The data thus reveal an irony. The Court relied on "common-
sense" to come to a conclusion that two indicators of criminality
(flight from police and presence in a high crime neighbor-
hood) more reliably justify police action than just one indicator
(flight from a police officer generally). This commonsense
conclusion may well hold up outside of high crime urban areas.
In NewYork City, however, the data suggest otherwise.
Whatever the ambiguities of the facts presented by this case,
the data in the chart above provide a measure of the intrusive-
ness of police stops. The data demonstrate clearly that New
York police (and, therefore, likely urban police generally) en-
gage in many more stops than arrests. The data in the New
York OAG Report also indicate that minorities in New York ex-
perience a much greater number of stops than do whites in New
York City. These same data also suggest that even though mi-
norities experience a higher number of stops, they do not expe-
rience a higher number of unconstitutional stops than do
whites. Finally, the data in the chart above provide a compara-
tive measure of the intrusiveness of police stops for different
categories of reasons.
Of course, none of these data provide a definitive answer to
Justice Souter's critically important question. We certainly are
not here suggesting that the Court determine that all states
ought to measure whether police properly observe the stan-
dards set out in Tery by making sure that the stop-to-arrest ratio
meets a certain preset number. Clearly, such a rule would be
problematically subject to manipulation. We are arguing, how-
ever, that these ratios help to make clear the normative decision
the Court must make regarding just how much intrusion into
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our lives will be constitutionally justified by law enforcement
methods. These data do not provide a definitive answer, but
they do indicate that this intrusion can be measured in some way
and they would render more transparent the Court's normative
choices and analysis. The data make plain that even indicators
traditionally considered to be good indicators of crime may well
require society to shoulder a quite high level of intrusion into
personal liberties. Perhaps society believes that this level of in-
trusion is justified. One thing is clear: we could be much more
confident of such a conclusion if the Court had a very public
and forthright discussion of the requisite probability of certainty
required to justify a police stop or an arrest based on empirical
data such as those presented here.
II. CONCLUSION
In this Foreword, we call for increased attention to social
science research in constitutional criminal procedure adjudica-
tion. In most criminal procedure cases-and certainly in Dicker-
son and Wardlow-the Court's decision-making process and
opinions would be greatly improved if the justices discussed and
referenced the relevant empirical research. By addressing social
science data, the Court would articulate more explicitly the val-
ues of interest-for example, how effective Miranda warnings
are in apprising accused persons of their right to silence, or how
reliable fleeing from the police is in predicting criminal behav-
ior. This, in turn, would make more transparent the interpre-
tive choices that underlie the balancing of liberty and order
interests.
In writing this Foreword together, we intend to emphasize
that the turn to social science does not tilt the playing field in
any particular ideological direction. It does not favor either of
Herbert Packer's two models of criminal procedure,2 ' nor John
Griffith's family model.2 2 Nor is it outcome determinative. It
does not answer the question presented, nor does it guarantee a
"' See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1964).
" SeeJohn Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or a Third "Model" of the Criminal
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1970).
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right answer. In the first place, social science evidence is often
in dispute and calls for interpretive judgment itself. But more
importantly, the outcome under a balancing-of-interests ap-
proach is determined by a normative assessment of the or-
der/liberty relationship, and not simply by quantifying the
values of interest. In this sense, we are not arguing that empiri-
cal evidence will resolve constitutional litigation, nor that social
science will constrain the Court's decision-making-although, if
treated respectfully, it will of course preclude the Court from
making decisions based on improper empirical findings. What
we are arguing, instead, is that it will improve the quality of the
Court's decision-making in constitutional criminal procedure
and render more transparent and open to criticism the Court's
opinions.
We anticipate at least three major criticisms and will address
these in conclusion. The first has to do with institutional com-
petence. Many may respond that courts are simply not capable
of dealing with complicated and conflicting social science data.
Judges and lawyers, for the most part, are not trained to assess
social science evidence and may not have advanced degrees in
the social sciences. To make matters worse, a lot of the empiri-
cal research that is likely to reach the courts may be funded or
conducted by ideologically motivated groups. How are the
courts to deal with such studies?
In the article that originated the concept of social authority,
John Monahan and Laurens Walker offer a set of guidelines for
courts to use to assess social science research. Monahan and
Walker point to critical review as a mechanism by which courts
could evaluate social science research,"' and they discuss meth-
ods by which courts could assess the validity and generalizability
of social science findings-including the question of research
sponsorship.2 Monahan and Walker point out, moreover, that
courts are unlikely to undertake these evaluations by themselves
and on their own initiative. The authors suggest instead that
the adversarial process itself will address some concerns about
the ability of courts to adequately appraise social science re-
11 See Monahan & Walker, supra note 60, at 499-501.




Once courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, more
forthrightly indicate an interest in social science relevant to
criminal procedure questions, litigating parties will be quick to
make arguments regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
empirical research.2 It also follows from our argument here
that social scientists and the professional organizations to which
they belong should be more involved in amicus brief writing
presenting issues within their competence, which would further
add to the strength and validity of social science research pre-
sented to the Court.0 7
A second likely criticism is that most of the values of inter-
est-especially personal liberty and efficient law enforcement-
are incommensurable and therefore cannot properly be com-
pared. Some scholars may respond to our proposal that any
balancing of liberty and order will inevitably favor the govern-
ment because one individual's interest in precluding an intru-
sion on her space and time will always lose out against the
enormity of society's collective interest.208 Lawrence Tribe, for
instance, has argued that "in that kind of calculus, the costs will
always seem weightier than the benefits. The benefits will be
elusive, intangible, diffuse."209 As Doff suggests, "Liberals dis-
trust law and economics because it undervalues "soft" variables.
. . ,,0 These values, some may argue, are incommensurate
among themselves and as against the interests of law enforce-
ment. In a similar vein, Weisselberg argues, in the Miranda con-
text, that
[a] cost/benefit analysis is utterly unsuited to the task, for there is no
2' Seeidat 512.
' See Dorf, supra note 37, at 56 (claiming that parties and amici will follow the lead
of the Court if it begins to rely to a greater extent on policy and empirical argu-
ments).
"7 SeeJames P- Acker, Social Science in Supreme Court Criminal Cases and Briefs: The
Actual and Potential Contribution of Social Scientists and Amid Curiae, 12 L. & HUM. BEH.
25, 42 (1990).
'" See Scott E. Sunby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara andTerry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 439 (1988).
" Tribe, supra note 29, at 157.
V, Dorf, supra note 37, at 46.
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single metric that can encompass Miranda's costs and its benefits....
[O]ne cannot establish empirically the ordering of Fifth Amendment
values ... and the needs of law enforcement. These values, interests,
and needs are incommensurate; they cannot be measured along the
same scale.
With respect to the specific argument that an individual's
particular interest is never weighty enough to overcome soci-
ety's collective interest in safety and order, we need only point'
out that aggregated societal interests appear on both sides of
the balance, not just on the side of safety. As a result, it is not
entirely correct that social order will always be weightier than
individual liberties. But the concern about the incommensura-
bility of the costs and benefits of different levels of government
respect for individual interests in privacy, autonomy and prop-
212erty is more difficult to address.
One answer is that acknowledging this kind of incommen-
surability does not necessarily preclude the comparability of soci-
ety's interests in both liberty and order.213 Those who criticize
the use of empirical evidence to inform the Court's balancing
analysis are not primarily concerned with this more pragmatic
approach. After all, this very approach produced the Miranda
opinion in the first place. Recall that Miranda's chief supporters
characterize the opinion in this way. Rather, critics are con-
cerned that the particular values they most cherish will be
muted if decision makers use empirical evidence to create a
cardinal scale against which law enforcement needs and various
constitutional values can be arrayed-a scale that critics do not
believe exists.
We believe this concern about empirical evidence is some-
what misplaced. These values, we contend, inevitably are and
must be compared in complex criminal procedure cases. With-
out some evidence, the Court's pronouncements about the im-
pact of its decisions amount to little more than bald assertions
of "common sense" or "intuition." Rather than fearing the utili-
2 Weisselberg, supra note 35, at 170-71.
212 Indeed, it is a very controversial and hot topic in law today. See generally, Sympo-
sium: Law and Incommensurability, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998).




zation of empirical and social science evidence in balancing or-
der and liberty interests, the Court and the advocates appearing
before it should strive to measure these values to the very best of
their ability.
Finally, a third criticism is. that our approach makes it too
easy for judges to insert their own ideological predispositions
into the resolution of the empirical questions. Some may argue
that the real decision-making process will actually be hidden in
technical and purportedly "neutral" discussions of the social sci-
ence data. Worse yet, it will have the aura of "science" and "ob-
jectivity" and will therefore be more insulated from criticism.
Rather than being more transparent, some may argue, the reli-
ance on science will mask or minimize the normativity and insu-
late it from attack.14
There is, undoubtedly, such a risk. A court deciding the
Dickerson case could, of course, fudge or nudge the science and
find that the Miranda regime has had such an exorbitant effect
on law enforcement that the warnings have to be abandoned.
But that would not insulate the opinion from criticism. It would
in fact expose the decision-making process to further criticism
from advocates and the public. In some cases, it is precisely the
exposure of the underlying social science that will afford more
accountability and transparency, and may allow for more criti-
cism and revision. In some cases, social science may counteract
bias, or at least highlight it. The Leon case demonstrates this
well, since both the majority and dissent relied on the same em-
pirical evidence.
These are important criticisms that merit more debate and
discussion than this Foreword would allow. Our firm conviction
is that the inevitable obstacles of institutional competence, in-
commensurability, and scientific myth do not derail our pro-
posal. To conclude, we suspect, and we hope, that more
infusion of social science will likely highlight potential biases,
215will inspire judges to make more narrow, limited and provi-
" See Richard Lempert, "Between Cup and Lip": Social Science Influences on Law and
Policy, 10 L. & POL. 167, 188-90 (discussing court use of social science for legitimation
and strategic purposes).
"' See Faigman, supra note 38.
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sional decisions, and, at a minimum, will hold judges more ac-
countable.
216 Recall that the Court's decision in Leon rested on an empirical determination
about the impact of the exclusionary rule on real-life police conduct, and Justice
Blackmun noted that "the provisional nature of empiricism invites testing and the
prospect of change." See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion. See also Dorf, supra note 37 at 61-69 (discussing the concept and benefits of pro-
visional adjudication).
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